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INTRODUCTION
Over the past decade, law enforcement authorities have amassed
huge collections of DNA samples and the identifying profiles derived
from them. It is a development that has been greeted with ominous
warnings' and extensive litigation.' Large DNA databanks routinely
help to identify the guilty and to exonerate the innocent, but as the
databanks grow, so do fears about civil liberties. Slogans like
"government-sponsored bioinvasion "3 vie with reports of "cold hits"" in
cases of rape, murder, and theft that otherwise would go unsolved.'
Perhaps the most controversial policy issue in the creation of these
databases is the question of coverage: Whose DNA profiles should be
stored in them? The possibilities extend from convicted violent sex
offenders to all convicted felons, to everyone arrested, to the entire
population.6 This Article questions the rationales for drawing the line at
all convicted offenders-which is fast becoming standard practice-or at
1. See D.H. Kaye, The Constitutionality of DNA Sampling on Arrest, 10
CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 455, 456-57 (2001) (citing examples).
2. See, e.g., Roe v. Marcotte, 193 F.3d 72 (2d Cir. 1999); Shaffer v. Saffle,
148 F.3d 1180 (10th Cir. 1998); Schlicher v. (NFN) Peters, 103 F.3d 940 (10th Cir.
1996); Boiling v. Romer, 101 F.3d 1336 (10th Cir. 1996); Kruger v. Erickson, 77 F.3d
1071 (8th Cir. 1996); Rise v. State, 59 F.3d 1556 (9th Cir. 1995); Gilbert v. Peters, 55
F.3d 237 (7th Cir. 1995); Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302 (4th Cir. 1992); Gaines v.
State, 998 P.2d 166 (Nev. 2000); Johnson v. Commonwealth, 529 S.E.2d 769 (Va.
2000); Doles v. State, 994 P.2d 315 (Wyo. 1999).
3. Paul R. Billings, Editorial, DNA Data Banks Would Taint Justice, BOSTON
GLOBE, Jan. 14, 1999, at A19.
4. E.g., Hooks v. State, 19 P.3d 294, 303 (Okla. Crim. App. 2001) (multiple
murderer-rapist identified in national database search); D.H. KAYE, SCIENCE IN
EVIDENCE 224-26 (1997); State Boosts Felons' DNA Database: Crime-Fighting Cache
Becomes Largest in U.S., S.F. CHRON., June 25, 2001, at Al (reporting that
California's DNA database of 200,000 profiles, now the largest in the nation, is
producing approximately one "cold hit" per week).
5. These "cold hits" can stretch back decades to solve "cold cases"-those
that the police had given up on. See, e.g., NAT'L INST. OF JUST., USING DNA TO SOLVE
COLD CASES (2002), available at http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffilesl/nij/194197.pdf; C.J.
Chivers, DNA Database Said to Link Inmate to 1979 Murder, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13,
2000, at BI.
6. Every state collects DNA from individuals convicted of various offenses.
M. DAWN HERKENHAM, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, STATE DNA DATABASE STATUTES:
SUMMARY OF PROVISIONS, at i-ii (1999); Robin Cheryl Miller, Annotation, Validity,
Construction, and Operation of State DNA Database Statutes, 76 A.L.R. 5th 239, 239
(2000). The federal government also takes DNA from federal offenders. See DNA
Analysis Backlog Elimination Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-546, 114 Stat. 2726. Most
European countries have established similar programs, although there the DNA typically
is collected at the time of an arrest. David Werrett, The Strategic Use of DNA
Profiling, Address Before the 18th International Congress on Forensic Haemogenetics
(Aug. 19, 1999).
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all arrestees-which may be where we are headed. It suggests that such
coverage results in sampling DNA disproportionately from racial
minorities, which exacerbates racial tensions and undermines the
preventative and investigative value of the databases. It argues that a
population-wide database with strict privacy protections may supply the
better answer to the coverage question, and to the privacy concerns
raised by any government program to take and analyze individuals'
DNA.
Part I discusses two theories that might dictate which offenders
should be included in these databases. The first theory holds that by
virtue of a conviction, offenders forfeit the Fourth Amendment right to
be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. This forfeiture-of-
rights theory would confine the databases to convicted offenders, but it
cannot be squared with settled constitutional principles. The second
theory holds that because convicted offenders are more likely to re-
offend than are other groups, they pose a special risk that justifies the
incursion on their Fourth Amendment rights. Although this recidivism
theory may seem more protective of individual liberties, it fails to
constrict coverage to convicted offenders or even to arrestees.
Part II considers extensions of coverage to various groups of people
who have not been convicted of crimes. It suggests that the Constitution
may permit DNA to be collected from persons who have only been
arrested, and even from certain groups of persons who have neither been
convicted nor arrested.
Part III questions the desirability of limiting database coverage to
convicted offenders, or to convicted offenders plus arrestees (or
"suspects"). It notes that by restricting coverage to these groups, we
are fast producing a racially distorted system in which, however
lawfully the DNA samples are taken, they are taken disproportionately
from members of racial minorities. We conclude that a population-wide
database would be more effective and more fair than any system in
which conviction or arrest is the threshold for database inclusion. We
also indicate how such a system can be structured to protect personal
privacy.
I. WHICH OFFENSES SHOULD TRIGGER INCLUSION?
DNA profiles of convicted sex offenders are obvious candidates for
inclusion in DNA databases. Indeed, most states began by authorizing
databases limited to sex-offender profiles as part of their general effort
to better protect women and children from sexual assault. Databases of
convicted sex-offender records were not especially controversial given
the general abhorrence of sex offenders, with the popular image of
4152003:413
416 WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW
rapists as sexual predators who strike again and again, and the ubiquity
of potentially incriminating biological evidence in most rape cases.7
However, it soon became difficult to confine to this group the
statutory authority to take DNA samples. First, the data never
supported the view that recidivism was dramatically higher for sex
offenders in general than for other categories of offenders. To the
contrary, recidivism rates were and still are similar or even higher for
other offender groupings.8 Second, potentially incriminating DNA
evidence is hardly peculiar to sex crimes. Traces of blood, saliva, hair,
and other DNA-bearing material are left at the scene of many types of
crimes.9 Finally, although sexual assault is among the most detested of
7. But see DNA ON TRIAL: GENETIC IDENTIFICATION AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE
(Paul R. Billings ed., 1992) (criticizing the creation of sex-offender databases).
8. PATRICK A. LANGAN & DAVID J. LEVIN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
RECIDIVISM OF PRISONERS RELEASED IN 1994 (2002). This study examines the arrest and
conviction records of a representative sample of all prisoners released in 1994 from the
prisons of fifteen states. The Bureau of Justice Statistics sample included 100% of those
released who had been serving sentences for rape. Overall, more than two-thirds
(67.5%) of all offenders were arrested on new charges within three years of their
release. The rate of re-arrest was highest among property offenders (e.g., motor vehicle
theft, 78.8%, and burglary, 74%). Among those who had been imprisoned for violent
offenses, the rate of re-arrest was highest for robbers, of whom 70.2% were arrested-
13.4% on new robbery charges. By contrast, fewer than half (46%) of those who had
been imprisoned for rape were arrested within three years of release-2.5 % on new rape
charges. Offenders imprisoned for rape had the lowest re-arrest rate of any group of
released prisoners (except for the 40.7% rate of arrest among the relatively few who had
been released after being imprisoned for homicide). Id. at 9 tbl. 10. For similar
findings, see LAWRENCE A. GREENFELD, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SEX OFFENSES
AND OFFENDERS: AN ANALYSIS OF DATA ON RAPE AND SEXUAL ASSAULT 26-27 (1997)
(reporting that, for rapists released from prisons of eleven states in 1983, the rate of re-
arrest over the three-year period after release was 60%, and the re-conviction rate was
36%, while for all violent offenders, the rates were higher-60% and 42%,
respectively).
9. By 1999, the United Kingdom's Forensic Science Service was able to
develop a DNA profile in 5% of all property-crime samples, and most of the hits in the
database for England and Wales were coming from burglary and vehicle theft cases
rather than from rapes or murders. Werrett, supra note 6; see also Forensics Help Trap
1,000 Car Thieves, BRISTOL EVENING POST, June 27, 2001, at 7, available at 2001 WL
22486231.
Early critics of DNA databases seemed unaware of the potential value of DNA
analysis in such cases. See, e.g., Philip L. Bereano, The Impact of DNA-Based
Identification Systems on Civil Liberties, in DNA ON TRIAL: GENETIC IDENTIFICATION
AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 7, at 121 ("[Mluch crime leaves no identifying tissue
behind (e.g., burglary)."). Even the National Academy of Sciences' Committee on
Forensic DNA Technology once thought it "clear" that a DNA database would not be
useful for "crimes of most types," such as "larcenies, burglaries, and assaults," and that
forcible rape was the only "major exception." COMM. ON DNA TECH., NATIONAL
RESEARCH COUNCIL, DNA TECHNOLOGY IN FORENSIC SCIENCE 120 (1992). Accordingly
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crimes, the public does not have high regard for murderers, burglars,
and petty thieves either.
The result is pressure to extend the coverage of the databases to all
violent felons; and then to all felons and many misdemeanants.' °
Defining the point at which the collection of DNA profiles should stop
requires a theory for including profiles in the database in the first place.
Two such theories can be found in case law on the constitutionality of
offender databases. One we call the forfeiture theory. It holds that upon
criminal conviction, individuals forfeit any right they might otherwise
enjoy to be free from having their DNA typed and the resulting profile
placed on file." But this notion of "forfeiture" is a conclusion in search
of an argument. To be sure, a conviction at a trial where the defendant
is afforded due process of law may trigger the most serious of
punishments-from deprivation of life, to loss of liberty, to loss of
property. The Constitution explicitly countenances these punishments. 2
But there are limits to what other deprivations of liberty or property are
constitutionally permissible. As the Supreme Court explained in Hudson
v. Palmer,3  "prisoners [must] be accorded those rights not
it intimated that databases should be restricted to "offenders convicted of violent sex
crimes." Id.
10. As of 1999, all states required sex offenders to give samples, thirty-six
included murder as a qualifying offense, twenty-seven included assault and battery, and
a minority included other felonies such as kidnapping, burglary, and robbery.
HERKENHAM, supra note 6, at unnumbered page 4 (chart of qualifying offenses). Five
states demanded samples from all felons. Id. As of February 2000, thirty-nine states
included murder, and eighteen included certain property offenses; seven states covered
all felons, and twenty-three included some misdemeanants. See Jonathan Kimmelman,
Risking Ethical Insolvency: A Survey of Trends in Criminal DNA Databanking, 28 J. L.
MED. & ETHICS 209, 219 (2000). By July 1, 2002, the number of states requiring all
felons to give samples had grown to twenty-two. KELLY Fox & DONNA LYONS, NAT'L
CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, FIGHTING CRIME WITH DNA, Oct. 2002,
available at http://www.ncsl.org.public/legis1042.htm.
11. Cf. Rise v. Oregon, 59 F.3d 1556, 1560 (9th Cir. 1995) ("[C]onvicted
felons ...do not have the same expectations of privacy in their identifying genetic
information that 'free persons' have."); Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302, 306 (4th Cir.
1992) ("With the person's loss of liberty upon arrest comes the loss of at least some, if
not all, rights to personal privacy otherwise protected by the Fourth Amendment.");
Editorial, DNA Testing for All Convicts, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 29, 2002, at 16, available at
2002 WL 2617486:
Defendants give up plenty of rights when they're convicted of crimes
and sentenced to prison. Chief among them is freedom. They also lose
much of their privacy.
That's why a new statewide proposal to require that all convicted
felons be required to submit a DNA sample shouldn't raise the hackles of
civil libertarians or anyone else.
12. See U.S. CONST. amends. V & XIV.
13. 468 U.S. 517 (1984).
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fundamentally inconsistent with imprisonment itself or incompatible with
the objectives of incarceration."" The state could hardly provide that a
citizen convicted of even the most heinous crime thereby forfeits the
right to free speech,' 5 the privilege against self-incrimination, 6 or the
plethora of other rights secured by the Constitution. 7
How, then, could the bare fact of conviction work a forfeiture of
the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures? It is true
that in Hudson, a narrow majority of the Court, in upholding random
"shakedown" searches of prison cells, wrote that "the Fourth
Amendment proscription against unreasonable searches does not apply
within the confines of the prison cell.' 8 The reason, however, was not
that those convicted of crime lose their Fourth Amendment rights. It
was that "privacy rights for prisoners in their individual cells simply
cannot be reconciled with the concept of incarceration and the needs and
objectives of penal institutions."19
This is not to say that individuals who have been convicted of
crimes must be treated as if they had not been. For example, unless
14. Id. at 523
15. See, e.g., Shaw v. Murphy, 532 U.S. 223, 231 (2001) (recognizing that
prisoners retain some First Amendment rights, but refusing to accord "special protection
to ... speech that includes legal advice"); Prison Legal News v. Cook, 238 F.3d 1145,
1153 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding unconstitutional a state policy prohibiting the receipt by
inmates of standard rate mail, as applied to subscription non-profit organization mail).
16. See, e.g., Lile v. McKune, 224 F.3d 1175, 1192 (10th Cir. 2000) (holding
that the state violated an inmate's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination
when it required him to choose between admitting incriminating information as part of a
sex abuse treatment program or suffering a transfer and loss of privileges).
17. See Hudson, 468 U.S. at 523-24 (citations omitted) (alterations in
original):
Like others, prisoners have the constitutional right to petition the
Government for redress of their grievances, which includes a reasonable
right of access to the courts.
Prisoners must be provided "reasonable opportunities" to exercise
their religious freedom guaranteed under the First Amendment. Similarly,
they retain those First Amendment rights of speech "not inconsistent with
[their] status as ... prisoner[s] or with the legitimate penological objectives
of the corrections system." They enjoy the protection of due process. And
the Eighth Amendment ensures that they will not be subject to "cruel and
unusual punishments." The continuing guarantee of these substantial rights
to prison inmates is testimony to a belief that the way a society treats those
who have transgressed against it is evidence of the essential character of that
society.
See also Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 99-100 (1987) (striking down a marriage
regulation that prohibited inmates from marrying unless the prison superintendent had
approved the marriage after finding compelling reasons for the marriage).
18. Hudson, 468 U.S. at 526.
19. Id.; see also Roe, 193 F.3d at 81-82.
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there is some right to be free from surveillance in public places,"0 the
police could decide to engage in more intense public surveillance of ex-
convicts on the theory that they pose greater risks to public safety-just
as they could decide to keep a close watch on teenagers hanging out in
groups. A prior conviction also can be a factor in determining whether
there is probable cause to arrest an ex-convict suspected of another
crime, and, at trial, prior convictions often are admitted into evidence.
Nevertheless, in itself, a conviction does not strip a person of the Fourth
Amendment's protection against unreasonable searches, and there is no
reason to view every post-conviction search as reasonable.2 In sum, if
convicts forfeit their Fourth Amendment rights, it must be for some
reason beyond the fact of conviction or imprisonment.
Thus, a second justification for convicted-offender DNA databases
is woven through the court opinions that find them permissible in the
face of Fourth Amendment challenges. This is a predictivist theory: If
persons convicted at least once are more likely to commit future crimes
for which DNA evidence might be found than are those with no such
criminal histories, then including DNA profiles of samples taken when
these offenders are convicted would be expected to help-perhaps
substantially-to deter and solve crimes. This theory thus distinguishes
convicted criminals on the ground that they pose greater risks. 2  It
20. No such right has been recognized. See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S.
276, 281 (1983) ("A person traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no
reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to another.").
21. In United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (2001), the Supreme Court
unanimously upheld a warrantless search of a probationer's apartment for explosives.
The Court determined that the search satisfied the Fourth Amendment's "touchstone" of
"reasonableness" because (1) the court granting probation imposed the condition that the
convict submit to any search "by any . . . law enforcement officer," and (2) the officer
here had "reasonable suspicion that a probationer subject to a search condition [was]
engaged in criminal activity [involving explosives]." Id. at 116, 118, 121. The
condition of probation, the Court reasoned, produced "significantly diminished privacy
interests," rendering reasonable suspicion rather than probable cause sufficient "to make
the intrusion on the individual's privacy interest reasonable." Id. at 121. Rather than
rely on a pure forfeiture theory, the Court demanded individualized suspicion, and it
explicitly avoided deciding "whether the probation condition so diminished, or
completely eliminated Knights's reasonable expectation of privacy . . . that a search by a
law enforcement officer without any individualized suspicion would have satisfied the
reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 120 n.6.
22. For example, in Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302 (4th Cir. 1992), the Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit observed:
Commonwealth officials say that the program attempts to address the
problem of felony recidivism in Virginia by identifying and increasing the
likelihood of convicting repeat offenders and by deterring those who might
otherwise commit a second felony. According to a study of violent felons
convicted in Virginia between 1985 and 1987, 36.4% had at least one prior
conviction for a felony. Only 26% had no prior criminal record and just
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requires us to look at the connection between "collection crimes"-those
that trigger the collection of DNA upon conviction-and "target" or
"traceable offenses"-those for which biological trace evidence might be
found. For a crime to qualify as a collection crime, the probability that
a person guilty of the collection crime (C) will commit, or has
committed, any target crime (7) must exceed the probability that a
person who has not committed any instance of C will commit, or has not
committed, T. In other words, C must be a risk factor for one or more
target crimes; meaning that individuals who are convicted for a
collection offense C are a greater risk for committing a target offense T
than people who are not guilty of the collection offense C.
The logic of the predictivist theory for limiting DNA databases to
some subset of convicted offenders can be stated neatly, but it is difficult
to apply. The justification turns on (1) the likelihood of future crimes,
by category of current conviction, as well as (2) the likelihood that the
scenes of future crimes committed by offenders of any given type will
present investigators with incriminating DNA evidence. Currently
available data on these probabilities are sketchy, and it proves difficult
to limit the sweep of the predictivist argument to convicted offenders. A
later arrest, upon probable cause to believe the arrestee has committed a
crime, is more likely among those who have been arrested at some point
in the past, and prior arrest generally has some predictive value,
whether or not a conviction follows.
But there are many predictors of who will engage in future
crimes-some of them more powerful than prior arrest or prior
conviction. Dysfunctional family or neighborhood, disengagement from
the labor market or school, past antisocial acts, age, gender, and a host
of other personal and environmental factors are, particularly in
over 19% had previously been convicted of nonviolent felonies. A United
States Department of Justice survey of more than half of those persons
released from the prisons of eleven states in 1983 revealed that an estimated
62.5% were arrested again for a felony or serious misdemeanor within three
years after release.
Id. at 304. Likewise, in Rise v. Oregon, 59 F.3d 1556 (9th Cir. 1995), the Ninth
Circuit referred to "uncontroverted evidence documenting the high rates of recidivism
among certain types of murderers and sexual offenders." Id. at 1561. If the predictivist
thesis holds, then the forfeiture theory, even if it were valid, would not be necessary, at
least for those offenders who are likely to reoffend. See Roe v. Marcotte, 193 F.3d 72,
82 (2d Cir. 1999) (declining to rely on the forfeiture theory and reasoning that
"[b]ecause studies cited by defendants indicate a high rate of recidivism among sexual
offenders, and because DNA evidence is particularly useful in solving such crimes, the
statute passes the 'special needs' balancing test"); State v. Olivas, 856 P.2d 1076, 1086
(Wash. 1993) (concluding that application of the "special needs" balancing test was "a
better reasoned approach" than the Fourth Circuit's analysis in Jones, which
"diminished the privacy rights of convicted persons").
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combination, statistical predictors of future criminal conduct.23 Thus,
the predictivist theory offers no satisfactory basis for separating people
who have been convicted of crimes, or who have been arrested, from
other people who carry comparable or even greater probabilities of
leaving incriminating traces of DNA behind in the commission of future
crimes.
If the simple forfeiture theory is untenable because convicts do not
necessarily lose all civil rights, and if the predictivist theory tends to
justify much more inclusive databases, what principle remains to confine
the databases to convicted offenders? If inclusion were to hinge on
conviction, not arrest, then perhaps the fact of a conviction could
properly be used as a side constraint on predictivism. That is, one
might acknowledge that there is some reason to include an individual's
profile in the database whenever there is an elevated probability of that
person subsequently committing crime of a type for which incriminating
DNA evidence is sometimes found by investigators, but that it would be
unfair to do so unless the individual at least once before has been found
guilty of some crime.
This side-constraint argument sounds promising, but it too fails.
Criminal punishment is a social practice of blaming and imposing
significant burdens on individuals in response to their doing what a
legislature has declared sufficiently wrong to deserve official censure
and punishment.24 It is appropriate to insist that these harms not be
imposed on an individual in the absence of a fair adjudication
establishing that the individual committed the crime.25 But acquiring
DNA profiles and storing them in a searchable database looks very little
like punishment, for which conviction is a prerequisite. The bodily
intrusion required to extract the information can be kept to a minimum
by using saliva, buccal swabs (from the inside of the cheek), or a laser-
based device that samples blood without leaving a mark. As we explain
later, the loci used to type the DNA can be limited to those that are no
more socially meaningful or potentially stigmatizing than a simple
fingerprint. Rather than constituting a criminal sanction, collecting and
storing DNA identification profiles in a database is a form of
23. See generally 9 PREDICTION AND CLASSIFICATION: CRIMINAL JUSTICE
DECISION MAKING (Don Gottfredson & Michael Tonry eds., 1987); PREDICTION IN
CRIMINOLOGY (David Farrington & Roger Tarling eds., 1985); Jack F. Williams,
Process and Prediction: Return to a Fuzzy Model of Pretrial Detention, 79 MINN. L.
REV. 325 (1994); Daniel S. Goodman, Note, Demographic Evidence in Capital
Sentencing, 39 STAN. L. REV. 499 (1987).
24. See generally Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and
Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REV. 349 (1997).
25. See generally Paul H. Robinson, Punishing Dangerousness: Cloaking
Preventive Detention as Criminal Justice, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1429 (2001).
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discovering and remembering information about someone. It is far less
onerous than the, requirement, recently deemed not to be punishment,26
that a sex offender register with local police and have his conviction,
home address, place of employment, and automobile described on the
Internet.27 In short, retaining DNA for identification purposes neither
communicates condemnation nor burdens individual autonomy as do
punishments authorized by the criminal law.
This is not to say that no burdens could flow from one's inclusion
in a DNA identification database. Human error will inevitably cause a
database sample to be mistyped or mislabeled in a way that raises
suspicion about or produces an accusation against an innocent person
whose profile is erroneously matched to a crime scene sample.
However, the established practice of extracting fresh samples from
suspects identified by database searches greatly reduces the chance of
accusation, conviction, and punishment of innocent persons.2" Of
course, an initial false accusation entails some burden on a suspect even
if it is quickly dispelled, but pursuing leads that turn out to be
unproductive is not forbidden by the important principle that the state
may not punish the innocent.2 Indeed, that principle supports thorough
26. Smith v. Doe, 123 S. Ct. 1140 (2003).
27. Id. at 1146. Even before Smith, lower courts repeatedly rejected claims
that DNA database laws imposed ex post facto punishment on convicted offenders.
E.g., Roe v. Marcotte, 193 F.3d 72 (2d Cir. 1999); Rise v. Oregon, 59 F.3d 1556,
1562 (9th Cir. 1995); Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302 (4th Cir. 1992); United States v.
Sczubelek, No. CRIN.A.94-8-SLR, 2003 WL 1818109 (D. Del. Apr. 2, 2003).
28. The fear has been expressed that "if you are in the database, you have a
greater chance of being erroneously accused of a crime-that's apparently occurred
recently in England." Simon Cole, Address at the Conference on DNA and the
Criminal Justice System (Nov. 20, 2000) (transcript available at
http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/dna/transcribetablepage.htm). Most news accounts of
the incident are unclear as to whether the individual in the database of some 666,000
profiles was charged with the burglary being investigated. They consistently state,
however, that the match occurred at only six loci. See, e.g., Richard Willing, Mismatch
Calls DNA Tests into Question, USA TODAY, Feb. 8, 2000, at 3A. With so few short
tandem repeat (STR) loci, one would expect coincidental matches about one time in
sixty. When the suspect provided an alibi, his DNA was retyped-this time at ten loci-
and he was promptly excluded as a suspect. Id. In the United States, the usual number
of loci examined in database searches is thirteen, making the frequency of a coincidental
match (for the same size database) much smaller.
The lesson, then, is not that there is a significant chance that a database match will
produce a false indictment or conviction, but that investigators and prosecutors must
understand that the implications of a match in the database depend on the size of the
database and the number and types of loci tested. A database match, standing alone,
should be the beginning, rather than the end, of the investigation.
29. The risk of false accusations from database searches is a prudential
consideration in designing and operating a law enforcement database. It is a reason to
have strict quality control and assurance measures, and to educate police and the public
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investigations, and any thorough investigation creates burdens for
individuals about whom investigators have initial suspicions. As we
explain below, innocents are far more likely to be burdened by suspicion
and false accusation if we lack a comprehensive DNA identification
database than if we use one.
In short, inclusion of an individual's DNA profile in a forensic
database simply is not "punishment," and need not carry any stigma of
criminality unless we make it so by the continued practice of including
only the profiles of persons convicted of crimes.3" There is not a
persuasive argument why, under constitutional or other principles, a
felony or other conviction is essential to inclusion. It therefore is
prudent to consider in what ways the databases might become more
inclusive, and what advantages and disadvantages extended DNA
databases might bring.
II. WHICH OTHER GROUPS MIGHT BE INCLUDED?
A. Volunteers and Suspects
Some suspects give samples "voluntarily" when asked to do so by
the police. For example, on the Fourth of July in 1992, someone killed
Sean Googin next to Cazenovia Lake in upstate New York. His killer
took his body out into the water in an aluminum canoe, weighted his
fatigue jacket with rocks from shore, and then left him in a grave of lake
grass. State police combed the area and quizzed local residents. They
took blood from about fifty citizens, some of them possible suspects,
others hometown kids who wanted to help solve the killing of one of
their neighbors. "No one, not one, ever refused us in Cazenovia," said
that a database "hit" is not the end of a criminal investigation. In fact, it is probable that
a population-wide database will be administered more carefully than one that is restricted
to those who have been convicted or arrested. See Simon Cole, Fingerprint
Identification and the Criminal Justice System: Lessons for the DNA Debate, in
TECHNOLOGY OF JUSTICE, supra note *:
[Ilt is likely that regulation and scrutiny will be more effective if everyone's
DNA is in the database. If everyone is a potential victim of an erroneous or
fabricated DNA match, then the politicians who fund the regulatory
agencies, watchdog committees, and public defenders who protect us against
such events will be more likely to maintain adequate funding over the long-
term, even as forensic DNA profiling inevitably ceases to be a hot issue and
fades into the woodwork of police practice.
30. Consistent with this view, courts have uniformly held that individuals can
be compelled to provide DNA samples even though their convictions occurred before the
enactment of DNA database laws. See, e.g., Jones, 962 F.2d at 309-10; Sczubelek,
2003 WL 1818109.
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the senior investigator. "They couldn't roll up their sleeves fast
enough. 3
Of course, not all suspects are so cooperative. But DNA often can
be acquired by a court order based on probable cause or the lesser
standard of "reasonable suspicion., 32  Inasmuch as any invasion of
bodily integrity and informational privacy is complete once the sample is
collected and analyzed, a strong argument can be made that the state has
the constitutional power to add such lawfully acquired profiles to the
database for use in unrelated investigations-even when the typing of a
suspect's or volunteer's DNA excludes him from further suspicion in the
case. 33 In essence, the argument is that there is no "search" when a
lawfully acquired profile is entered in the database or is compared to the
profiles from unsolved crimes.34
Even "elimination samples" could end up in databases. 35  For
example, many of the men tested in the New York case were not
considered suspects. Could the police create a database of such local
residents for possible use in future investigations? Or consider a rape
case in which a semen stain is found on the bed where the rape
31. See Dick Case, Trail of Blood in Worried Town, POST-STANDARD
(Syracuse), Apr. 3, 2001, at A7, available at 2001 WL 5536260 (internal quotation
marks omitted). Even so, the case went unsolved until 2001, when the DNA profile of a
man arrested in 1999 and convicted of sodomy was added to New York's statewide
database.
32. See, e.g., Bousman v. Iowa District Court for Clinton County, 630
N.W.2d 789, 800 (Iowa 2001) (explaining that although "[a] nontestimonial
identification order [for oral swabs] must be . . . supported by reasonable grounds to
suspect that the subject of the order committed the crime under investigation. Probable
cause . . . is not necessary"); Wilson v. State, 752 A.2d 1250 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
2000) (announcing order compelling suspect to provide a DNA sample based on
probable cause); In re Non-Testimonial Identification Order Directed to R.H., 762 A.2d
1239 (Vt. 2000) (upholding the constitutionality of a Vermont rule as applied to an order
for a saliva sample based on reasonable suspicion); Johnson v. Commonwealth, 529
S.E.2d 769, 774 (Va. 2000) (relying on a database match to show probable cause); cf.
Doe v. Senechal, 725 N.E.2d 225 (Mass. 2000) (finding that even if the Fourth
Amendment applies to civil actions not involving the government, a court-ordered buccal
swab to test whether a member of the staff of a residential treatment facility for mentally
ill adolescents fathered the child of a patient is a reasonable search and seizure).
33. Cases reaching this conclusion include Bickley v. State, 489 S.E.2d 167
(Ga. Ct. App. 1997); Smith v. State, 734 N.E.2d 706, 709 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000);
Wilson, 752 A.2d at 1268-72; and People v. King, 663 N.Y.S.2d 610, 614 (App. Div.
1997).
34. Cf. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 354 (1974) (explaining that
grand jury "[q]uestions based on illegally obtained evidence are only a derivative use of
the product of a past unlawful search and seizure. They work no new Fourth
Amendment wrong.").
35. See CECELIA CROUSE & D.H. KAYE, THE RETENTION AND SUBSEQUENT USE
OF SUSPECT, ELIMINATION, AND VICTIM DNA SAMPLES OR RECORDS, A REPORT TO THE
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF DNA EVIDENCE (Feb. 6, 2001).
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occurred. The prosecution may need to eliminate the victim's boyfriend
or husband as the possible source of that stain so that it can be attributed
to the defendant without equivocation. If the victim's partner consents,
as is typical, and there is no discussion of what will be done with the
information afterward, does the Fourth Amendment allow the state to
add it to a database?
36
The answer would be in the affirmative if an initial voluntariness
standard applies. Under this approach, the pivotal question is whether
the individual voluntarily supplied the sample in the first instance. If so,
there was constitutionally sufficient consent to the initial search, and the
police may make subsequent use of the resulting information without
seeking a magistrate's approval. The sole issue is the voluntariness of
the initial acquisition of the sample. This approach contrasts with a
limited-scope-of-consent standard, under which one asks not merely
whether the initial consent was the product of illegitimate coercion, but
also whether there was consent, explicit or implicit, to the subsequent
use of the sample.
1. THE INITIAL VOLUNTARINESS STANDARD
Cases can be found that seem to support these two distinct and
anticlinal approaches. In the context of the search of a car in which
stolen checks were found under the rear seat, the Supreme Court held in
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte"7 that consent is effective as long as it is not
coerced. Unlike a waiver of rights at trial, which must be "knowing"
and "intelligent," consent to a search need not be based on complete
information.3" Indeed, in Washington v. State,39 the Supreme Court of
36. Of course, there may be statutory or other barriers to this practice. See
Cerisse Anderson, DNA Results Barred From City's Database, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 18,
2002, at 1.
37. 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
38. See, e.g., United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 207 (2002) (reasoning
that "[a]lthough [three armed police officers who boarded a Greyhound bus stopped at a
terminal and asked passengers about their baggage] did not inform respondents of their
right to refuse [a pat-down search of their persons, they] did request permission to
search, and the totality of the circumstances indicates that their consent was voluntary,
so the searches were reasonable"); Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 241 ("There is a vast
difference between those rights that protect a fair criminal trial and the rights guaranteed
under the Fourth Amendment. Nothing, either in the purposes behind requiring a
'knowing' and 'intelligent' waiver of trial rights, or in the practical application of such a
requirement suggests that it ought to be extended to the constitutional guarantee against
unreasonable searches and seizures."). Contra Barry Scheck, Remarks at Meeting of
the National Commission on the Future of DNA Evidence (Nov. 19, 2000) (asserting
that the intelligent, knowing waiver standard used for trial rights also applies to pretrial
encounters in which an individual is asked to consent to a search).
39. 653 So. 2d 362 (Fla. 1994).
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Florida held that police may trick suspects into giving DNA samples for
one investigation by asking them to provide them for unrelated
investigations. Alice Berdat, a 93-year-old woman, was murdered in
her bedroom. She had been badly beaten and vaginally and anally
raped. Anthony Washington was imprisoned at a work release center
two miles from the woman's home. He did not show up at his job
during the time of the rape, and he sold Berdat's gold watch to a
coworker. The detective investigating the murder did not tell
Washington that he suspected him of this murder. Instead, he asked
Washington for blood and hair samples to use in an unrelated sexual
battery case. Washington provided these samples. When the state
sought to use the samples in the murder case, Washington moved to
suppress them. The trial court denied the motion, and Washington was
convicted of the murder, burglary, and sexual battery. The Supreme
Court of Florida affirmed the conviction. It reasoned as follows:
Washington stated that he understood his rights, orally waived
them, and freely and voluntarily provided [the detective] with
hair and blood samples. . . . [O]nce the samples were validly
obtained, albeit in an unrelated case, the police were not
restrained from using the samples as evidence in the murder
case 40
This result is consistent with decisions of the United States Supreme
Court in Fifth Amendment cases4 in which police obtain information
while interrogating suspects without informing them of the true purpose
of the interrogation42 or by feeding them false information. 43 Thus, the
40. Id. at 364.
41. The Schneckloth majority relied prominently on the conception of
voluntariness derived from the interrogation and confession cases to determine the
meaning of "voluntariness" for Fourth Amendment purposes. See 412 U.S. at 223-27.
42. In Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564 (1987), an informant told agents of
the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) that Spring was engaged in the
interstate transportation of stolen firearms and that Spring had participated in a killing in
Colorado. Id. at 566. The agents set up an undercover operation to purchase firearms
from Spring. Id. They arrested him during the purchase, repeatedly advised him of his
Miranda rights, and secured his consent to interrogation. Id. at 567. However, they did
not reveal that they were interested in the Colorado murder, and they proceeded to
question him about it. Id. at 567-68. At a trial in Colorado for the murder, Spring
moved to suppress statements he made to the ATF agents as well as further statements to
the police in Colorado on the theory that all these statements were the result of an
invalid waiver of his right not to incriminate himself. Id. The trial court admitted the
evidence, but the Colorado Court of Appeals reversed, and the Colorado Supreme Court
affirmed this reversal, reasoning that "the absence of an advisement to Spring that he
would be questioned about the Colorado homicide, and the lack of any basis to conclude
that at the time of the execution of the waiver, he reasonably could have expected that
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use of undercover agents and "sting" operations without prior judicial
approval based on probable cause rests on the premise that the
government can secure information by trickery," or at the very least,
without disclosing all the facts that a citizen might wish to know.45
2. THE SCOPE-OF-CONSENT STANDARD
However, the issue in Schneckloth was not the scope of consent. It
was whether the consent to the search of the car then and there-a
search of well-defined scope and duration-was valid notwithstanding
the lack of a Miranda-like warning that would have revealed that the
police had no right to search without consent. Schneckloth merely holds
that the validity of such consent is measured by a totality-of-the-
circumstances test for voluntariness." There was no ambiguity about
the interrogation would extend to that subject, are determinative factors in undermining
the validity of the waiver." Colorado v. Spring, 713 P.2d 865, 874 (Colo. 1985).
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the Colorado Supreme Court. Justice Powell's
opinion for the Court observed that "Spring's argument strains the meaning of
compulsion past the breaking point." 479 U.S. at 573. The Court explained that
"[albsent evidence that Spring's 'will [was] overborne and his capacity for self-
determination critically impaired' because of coercive police conduct, his waiver of his
Fifth Amendment privilege was voluntary ....... Id. at 574 (alteration in original)
(quoting Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 602 (1961), and citing Colorado v.
Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 163-64 (1986)). Emphasizing that "[t]he Constitution does not
require that a criminal suspect know and understand every possible consequence of a
waiver of the Fifth Amendment privilege," the Court held that the failure to inform
Spring that the questioning could extend beyond the offense for which he was arrested
and that his answers could be used in more than one case did not render his consent
invalid or limit its scope. Id.
43. E.g., Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495-96 (1977) (per curiam)
(recounting officers' falsely telling suspect that the suspect's fingerprints had been found
at crime scene).
44. See, e.g., Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 297 (1990) ("Miranda forbids
coercion, not mere strategic deception by taking advantage of a suspect's misplaced trust
in one the suspect supposes to be a fellow prisoner. . . .Ploys to mislead a suspect or
lull him into a false sense of security that do not rise to the level of compulsion or
coercion to speak are not within Miranda's concerns."); Hoffa v. United States, 385
U.S. 293, 304 (1966) (finding statements made to an undercover agent placed near a
suspect to gather incriminating information are admissible where "no claim ha[d] been
or could [have been] made that [they] were the product of any sort of coercion, legal or
factual").
45. Of course, if the government uses false pretenses to make it appear that the
individual has no choice but to acquiesce in a search, then the ostensible consent is
ineffective. For example, if police falsely claim that they have a search warrant, "[t]he
situation is instinct with coercion" and "[wihere there is coercion there cannot be
consent." Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 550 (1968).
46. As Justice Stewart explained:
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the extent of the search to which consent was given. Indeed, the
occupant of the car opened the glove compartment and trunk for the
police.47 Washington involves the separate question of whether, having
consented to give up the samples for one use-the sexual battery case-
the suspect runs the risk that the state will make a second use of them in
the murder cases.
It is tempting to suggest that the second use is permissible under the
general principle that once the state acquires physical evidence
legitimately, the Fourth Amendment does not bar subsequent uses of the
same evidence. This principle rests on the theory that the invasion of
privacy or liberty lies in the initial intrusion or seizure. The additional
use may have adverse consequences to the defendant, but it is not itself a
further invasion of privacy or liberty. It is, for example, reasonable to
hold that information legitimately discovered in the search of an
apartment pursuant to a warrant based on probable cause with respect to
one crime also may be used in the investigation of a subsequent crime.
After all, the entry into the apartment is complete and fully justified by
the warrant.
Arguably, this subsequent-use theory breaks down when applied to
consent-based searches. The invasion of privacy may be complete when
the consenting individual allows the police access to property or gives
them a bodily sample. But the justification is that the individual has
elected not to invoke the right to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures. This justification may not be apposite when the consent is
limited to a particular use. In that situation, the argument goes, the
search cannot extend beyond the initial scope of consent-without
subsequent consent or a court order.
The problem with this somewhat formal analysis is that the consent
exception s to the general requirement of a warrant based on probable
Our decision today is a narrow one. We hold only that when the
subject of a search is not in custody and the State attempts to justify a search
on the basis of his consent, the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments require
that it demonstrate that the consent was in fact voluntarily given, and not the
result of duress or coercion, express or implied. Voluntariness is a question
of fact to be determined from all the circumstances, and while the subject's
knowledge of a right to refuse is a factor to be taken into account, the
prosecution is not required to demonstrate such knowledge as a prerequisite
to establishing a voluntary consent.
Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 248-49.
47. Id. at 220.
48. See 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT § 4.1(b), at 404 (3d ed. 1996) (explaining the rationale of the
"well-established exception to the warrant requirement [of] search by consent").
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cause flows from the reasonableness clause of the Fourth Amendment 49
rather than from the doctrine of waiver. The basic teaching of
Schneckloth remains. Voluntariness, not informed consent, establishes
that a warrantless search is constitutionally reasonable, at least in most
contexts. To be sure, there may be unusual situations in which an
individual must know of the contemplated secondary uses of a DNA
sample for putative consent to be valid,5" but the use of the sample in
Washington in the murder case along with the sexual battery case does
not seem to be one of them. It seems fair to say that unless the suspect
is explicit about the limited scope of his consent, he runs the risk that
the police will use the sample in more than one investigation. 5
But even if the Constitution permits the state to incorporate the
profile of a "voluntary" sample into a database without explicit consent,
it is appropriate to ask whether police should do so. The objection to
retention of the information has its greatest force with regard to pure
"elimination samples." Individuals who were never suspected of
wrongdoing and who fulfill what they may perceive as their civic duty to
cooperate with the authorities could find themselves entangled in
unrelated investigations. And, if the decision is made to allow law
enforcement officials to retain the information, a further question arises:
Should police seeking consent to DNA sampling be clear about their
intention to use the DNA in future investigations? Should a form, much
like a Miranda warning, be required that states something like, "I
consent to having my DNA profile included in a database that will be
used in future criminal investigations"? Or would such consent be an
49. The first clause of the Fourth Amendment bars unreasonable searches and
seizures, while the second clause requires that warrants be based on probable cause and
meet certain other requirements. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Court has construed the
Amendment as generally banning searches not based on a warrant supported by probable
cause-subject to a list of categorical exceptions, such as consent. See, e.g., Mincey v.
Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978) (asserting that "[tihe Fourth Amendment proscribes
all unreasonable searches and seizures, and it is a cardinal principle that 'searches
conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate,
are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment-subject only to a few specifically
established and well-delineated exceptions.'" (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 357 (1967)).
50. Cf. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 78 (2001) (holding that
where state medical personnel induce a patient to provide a bodily sample for the
intended but unexpressed purpose of enforcing the criminal law, the "waiver of known
rights standard" supplants the normal voluntariness standard because "[tihe reasonable
expectation of privacy enjoyed by the typical patient undergoing diagnostic tests in a
hospital is that the results of those tests will not be shared with nonmedical personnel
without her consent").
51. Following Ferguson, however, one might argue that the donor of an
elimination sample has a reasonable expectation that the police will use the sample only for
the stated purpose. See id.
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empty formality, not voluntary at all, since many people who are
approached by the police reasonably assume that if they do not consent,
they will continue to be suspects in the cases then under investigation?52
In our view, whenever police seek consent for DNA sampling, a clear
record of the scope of consent at the outset is desirable. The fear that
refusal to cooperate will heighten or create suspicions does'not rise to
the level of coercion that would vitiate consent under the normal
voluntariness standard.
B. Arrestees
DNA collection during custodial arrests is explicitly authorized in a
few states. 3 Various arguments to show the constitutionality of this
practice have been advanced." For instance, lower courts have long
recognized a "true identity" exception to the warrant and probable cause
requirements of the Fourth Amendment. They always have held that the
state may create and store photographic and fingerprint records that
establish a permanent record of the identity of all arrested individuals."
52. See, e.g., David M. Halbfinger, Police Dragnets for DNA Tests Draw
Criticism, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2003, at Al; Jack Leonard, Using DNA to Trawl for
Killers, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2001, at Al (describing views of "privacy rights
advocates").
53. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:609(A) (1992 & West Supp. 2003) ("A
person who is arrested for a felony sex offense or other specified offense on or after
September 1, 1999, shall have a DNA sample drawn or taken at the same time he is
fingerprinted pursuant to the booking procedure."); S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 23-5-
14 (1998 & Supp. 2002) (providing, that "[t]he Attorney General shall procure and file
for record genetic marker grouping analysis information from any person taken into
custody for a violation of the provisions of chapter 22-22"); Maria Gold, Va. to Begin
Taking DNA After Arrests for Felonies: Prosecutors, Rights Activists Split on Database
Expansion, WASH. POST, Jan. 1, 2003, at B1. Other states provide for the collection of
DNA samples following an indictment for certain crimes. See CAL. PENAL CODE ANN.
§ 297(b)(3) (1999 & West Supp. 2003) ("For the purposes of this subdivision, 'a
suspect' means a person against whom an information or indictment has been filed for
one of the crimes listed in subdivision (a) of Section 296. For the purposes of this
subdivision, a person shall remain a suspect for two years from the date of the filing of
the information or indictment or until the DNA laboratory receives notification that the
person has been acquitted of the charges or the charges were dismissed."); TEX. GOV'T
CODE ANN. § 411.1471 (effective Sept. 1, 2001) (authorizing collection of DNA at the
same time as fingerprinting in kidnapping, sexual assault, and other cases and providing
for destruction of samples and records on acquittal or dismissal of the charges); Stephen
Braun, Virginia Aggressively Uses DNA to Solve Other Cases: A Law Allows Police to
Compel Suspects in Violent Offenses to Give Samples for Study in Unsolved Crimes,
L.A. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2003.
54. See D.H. Kaye, Two Fallacies About DNA Databanks for Law
Enforcement, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 179 (2001) [hereinafter Kaye, Two Fallacies]; Kaye,
supra note 1.
55. Early cases are discussed in Kaye, supra note 1.
430
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Although the DNA molecule itself differs from a fingerprint in that it
could reveal significant hereditary conditions or propensities to contract
certain diseases, a DNA type need be no more informative than an
ordinary fingerprint. For example, the thirteen core STR loci used in
current criminal offender databases are noncoding, nonregulatory loci
that are not linked to any genes in a way that would permit one to
discern any socially stigmatizing conditions.56 The "profile" of an
individual's DNA molecule that is stored in a properly constructed DNA
identification database (like the FBI's Combined DNA Index System
(CODIS)) is a series of numbers. The numbers have no meaning except
as a representation of molecular sequences at DNA loci that are not
indicative of an individual's personal traits or propensities.57 In this
sense, the CODIS 13-STR "profile" is very much like a social security
number-though it is longer and is assigned by chance, not by the
federal government. In itself, the series of numbers can tell nothing
about a person.58 But because the sequence of numbers is so likely to be
56. See Mark Benecke, Coding or Non-Coding, That Is the Question, 3 EMBO
REPORTS 498, 500-01 (2002); D.H. Kaye, Bioethics, Bench and Bar: Selected
Arguments in Landry v. Attorney General, 40 JURIMETRICS J. 193, 198 (2000); Kaye,
Two Fallacies, supra note 54, at 185-88; Randall S. Murch & Bruce Budowle, Are
Developments in Forensic Applications of DNA Technology Consistent with Privacy
Protections?, in GENETIC SECRETS: PROTECTING PRIVACY AND CONFIDENTIALITY IN THE
GENETIC ERA 212, 224 (Mark A. Rothstein ed., 1997).
57. Biologists often use the phrase "DNA genotype" to refer to DNA
sequences, even when the sequences have nothing to do with genes. See, e.g., David H.
Kaye & George F. Sensabaugh, Jr., Reference Guide on DNA Evidence, in FEDERAL
JUDICIAL CTR., REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 485 (2d ed. 2000). This
is because all DNA sequences are inherited like genes, but the phrase can be terribly
misleading if it invites people to think that all DNA loci contain significant, intensely
personal information. The vast majority do not.
58. Some commentators have emphasized that even some noncoding sequences
can be statistically associated with the socially constructed categories of race or
ethnicity. See Troy Duster, The Inexorable Expansion of the DNA Forensic Database
and the Looming Spectre of an Early 21st Century Phrenology, in TECHNOLOGY OF
JUSTICE, supra note *; Kathy Hudson & Aaron M. Bailey, The Human Genome Project,
DNA Science and the Law: The American Legal System's Response to Breakthroughs in
Genetic Science, 51 AM. U. L. REv. 431, 442 (2001) (expressing "high concern" over
"DNA-based racial profiling"). But conspicuously absent from such commentary is any
explanation of why inferences of race based on crime-scene DNA evidence are any more
problematic, when they serve to focus a criminal investigation, than eyewitness accounts
of race, which often serve that purpose now. See Edward J. Imwinkelried & D.H.
Kaye, DNA Typing: Emerging or Neglected Issues, 76 WASH. L. REV. 413 (2001)
(analyzing the constitutionality of inferring physical and ethnic characteristics from
crime-scene samples). Racial grouping and physical features are not the kind of
sensitive, personal information that one can reasonably expect to keep secret. See
United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 14 (1973) ("[P]hysical characteristics . . . are
constantly exposed to the public. Like a man's facial characteristics, or handwriting, his
voice is repeatedly produced for others to hear. No person can have a reasonable
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unique (with the exception of identical twins), it can be linked to
identifiers such as name, date of birth, or social security number, and
used to determine the source of DNA found in the course of criminal
investigations or to identify human remains or persons who are lost or
missing.59
If the Constitution allows the police to keep a fingerprint or a
photograph as a biometric identifier, as many courts have held, then it is
hard to see why they cannot keep a DNA profile if it is properly limited
to "vacuous" loci. Once the state legitimately possesses the DNA
record of an arrestee, it would require no further information from the
individual to examine a database of DNA types found in the crime-scene
evidence from unsolved crimes in order to ascertain whether any match
the profile. Thus, using the arrestee's profile to query the database for a
matching type would not be a new search or seizure within the meaning
of the Fourth Amendment. Neither would it be a new search or seizure
to add that profile to others taken from arrestees or convicted offenders,
for use in future criminal investigations.
Two recent Supreme Court cases, however, cloud this simple
analysis. Under City of Indianapolis v. Edmond,6° and Ferguson v. City
of Charleston,6 the fact that a warrantless search could have been
conducted for an administrative purpose and its fruits used to prove a
criminal charge is not necessarily sufficient to dispense with the need for
a warrant and probable cause. In Edmond, the Court struck down a
program in which police used dogs to sniff for drugs in vehicles pulled
over in groups at fixed roadblocks. Distinguishing sharply between
"highway safety interests and the general interest in crime control,"62
the majority reasoned that "[b]ecause the primary purpose of the
Indianapolis narcotics checkpoint program is to uncover evidence of
ordinary criminal wrongdoing, the program contravenes the Fourth
Amendment."63 In Ferguson, the Court invalidated a program in which
expectation that others will not know the sound of his voice, any. more than he can
reasonably expect that his face will be a mystery to the world.").
59. Because a DNA profile is inherited from one (the mother in the case of
mitochondrial DNA, and the father in the case of the Y chromosome) or both parents (in
the case of the nuclear DNA analyzed for law enforcement databases), the profile can be
used in investigations of kinship, such as parentage determinations. This biological fact
makes DNA profiles potentially more revealing than fingerprints or social security
numbers-and also more useful in missing-person cases.
60. 531 U.S. 32 (2000).
61. 532 U.S. 67 (2001).
62. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 40.
63. Id. at 41-42. Six Justices subscribed to this view. Justice O'Connor wrote
the Edmond majority opinion. Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissenting opinion, which was
joined, in part, by Justices Scalia and Thomas, argues against "a new non-law-
enforcement primary purpose test lifted from a distinct area of Fourth Amendment
432
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a state university hospital tested urine samples from pregnant women for
cocaine and reported positive results to the police so that those women,
fearing prosecution, would be induced to participate in substance-abuse
counseling offered as an alternative to criminal prosecution. Again, the
majority of the Court emphasized "the relevant primary purpose,"
which was said to be "the arrest and prosecution of drug-abusing
mothers. ""
Edmond and Ferguson do not repeal the principle that police may
make an additional use of lawfully acquired information, but they do
reveal that the additional-use doctrine does not insulate a multipurpose
program whose primary purpose is the enforcement of the criminal law.
Certainly, the Indianapolis police could have employed roadblocks to
check for intoxicated drivers if they conformed to established Supreme
Court requirements for roadblocks having this purpose.65  While
conducting this check, they could have brought a drug-sniffing dog near
the driver's vehicle. After all, the use of a dog to detect the odor of
narcotics is not a search.66 Therefore, the dissent argued, "[t]he State's
use of a drug-sniffing dog, according to the Court's holding, annuls
what is otherwise plainly constitutional."67 To which the majority
responded: "the constitutional defect of the program is that its primary
purpose is to advance the general interest in crime control." 68 Likewise,
the Ferguson Court focused on "programmatic purpose ,69 and
emphasized that "the direct and primary purpose of [the] policy" was
"to generate evidence for law enforcement purposes." 70  In bold,
Edmond and Ferguson indicate that where the primary purpose of a
program involving searches or seizures is to generate evidence for
jurisprudence relating to the searches of homes and businesses." Id. at 53 (Rehnquist,
C.J., dissenting). Justice Thomas also wrote a two-paragraph dissent signaling that he
might be willing to reach the same result as the majority by overruling the Court's
special-needs cases allowing suspicionless roadblocks in any circumstances. His
explanation is terse: "I rather doubt that the Framers of the Fourth Amendment would
have considered 'reasonable' a program of indiscriminate stops of individuals not
suspected of wrongdoing." Id. at 56 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
64. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 81-82 (internal quotation marks omitted).
65. See Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 451-53 (1990).
66. Every Justice accepted this proposition. See Edmond, 531 U.S. at 42
("[Tihat officers walk a narcotics-detection dog around the exterior of each car at the
Indianapolis checkpoints does not transform the seizure into a search."); id. at 52-53
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) ("[A] 'sniff test' by a trained narcotics dog is not a 'search'
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment because it does not require physical
intrusion of the object being sniffed and it does not expose anything other than the
contraband items." (citing United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 706-07 (1983)).
67. Id. at 48.
68. Id. at 44 n. 1.
69. 532 U.S. at 81.
70. Id. at 83-84.
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criminal prosecutions, the Fourth Amendment ordinarily requires a
warrant supported by probable cause.
"Normal law enforcement" would appear to be the primary purpose
of a program requiring arrestees to provide DNA samples, typing those
samples at standard forensic loci, and including the profiles in an
identification database that can be searched for a profile matching DNA
recovered in connection with unsolved past or future crimes.7" By itself,
the fact that an additional purpose of such a database would be
administrative maintenance of unalterable, biometric identifiers of those
who have been arrested would not automatically make the program
permissible. Under Edmond and Ferguson, the "primary" law
enforcement purpose would need to be justified on another theory.72
Such a theory is readily available. Stopping drivers to search
automobiles for narcotics and testing women for cocaine use represent
substantially greater intrusions on privacy than sampling individuals'
DNA and typing it at the normal forensic loci. A DNA identification
database can be structured to respect most individual privacy interests,
and it can be administered fairly. Because there are powerful crime-
control reasons for a state to establish arrestee DNA databases, it is
neither heretical nor misguided to ask whether the Supreme Court will
in due course recognize an exception to the warrant requirement for
biometric identifiers like fingerprints and DNA profiles.
The answer turns on the Court's balancing of competing interests.
The pivotal factors are the gravity of the privacy invasion, the
practicality and value of requiring advance judicial approval and
individual suspicion, and the importance of the government interests
advanced by the database system. Although the point is surely
debatable, a case can be made that this balance tips in favor of allowing
arrestee DNA profiles to be retained in the databases.73
71. United States v. Miles, 228 F. Supp. 2d 1130 (E.D. Cal. 2002). Several
courts have reached a contrary conclusion, reasoning that gathering intelligence
information before any specific individual is suspected of a crime is not "ordinary law
enforcement." E.g., Sczubelek, 2003 WL 1818109; Nicholas v. Goord, 2003 WL
256774 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); United States v. Reynard, 220 F. Supp. 2d 1142 (S.D. Cal.
2002). A few courts have upheld database laws by blithely ignoring Edmond and
Ferguson. Groceman v. Dep't of Justice, No. CIV.A. 301CV1619G, 2002 WL
1398559 (N.D. Tex. June 26, 2002); State v. Maass, 64 P.3d 382 (Kan. 2003).
72. Having recognized that the government's "special needs" argument for
compelling a probationer to submit a DNA sample for inclusion in the federal DNA
databank was undercut by Edmonds and Ferguson, the district court in Miles, 228 F.
Supp. 2d 1130, jumped to the conclusion that the federal statute was unconstitutional as
applied to probationers. This conclusion is suspect because it overlooks the possibility
that an exception other than the "special needs" exception might provide the necessary
justification for the program of searches or seizures.
73. Kaye, supra note 1, at 499-504.
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Of course, this judgment does not imply that it would be desirable
to collect and retain DNA profiles of arrestees. It simply means that the
Constitution does not necessarily preclude it. As we point out in Part
III, there are significant drawbacks to using arrest as the threshold for
acquiring database profiles.
C. Indirect Acquisition by the State
1. SHED DNA
Thus far, we have discussed classes of people whose DNA the
police may acquire directly from the person. But, without giving it a
thought, we all leave trails of DNA behind as we move through the
world. New York police have taken a DNA sample from a suspect's
"abandoned" coffee cup 74 and from saliva that a homeless man spit on
the street.7" In New Zealand, police extracted DNA from a drinking
straw in a milk shake that a man was seen enjoying in a shopping mall
just before he committed an armed robbery." Checking the unsolved
case database of samples led to his also being charged with twenty-eight
other offenses.77 In Chicago, police pocketed the butt of a cigarette they
supplied to a suspect during an interrogation.78
If DNA or "genetic information" is the "property" of the individual
in whose cells it is found, as a few state statutes declare, then is
collecting and analyzing the DNA found on the cup, the sidewalk, the
straw, and the cigarette an interference with this ownership interest?79
74. Richard Willing, As Police Rely More on DNA, States Take a Closer Look,
USA TODAY, June 6, 2000, at Al; The Crier Report: Mandatory DNA Testing (Fox
television broadcast, Mar. 11, 1999), available at 1999 WL 18330169.
75. See Christopher Francescani, Sex Fiend Admits He Killed 5 in Brooklyn,
N.Y. POST, Mar. 10, 2001, at 11; William K. Rashbaum, Man Cleared by DNA Tests
Led Police to Murder Suspect, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2000, at A25.
76. Cf. Ray Delgado, How Cop Got DNA to Nail Rapist: She Got Suspect to
Drink Soda, Then Snatched Straw, S.F. CHRON. Aug. 14, 2001, at Al (reporting on
rape conviction that resulted from a detective's removing, to obtain a saliva sample, the
soda cup a suspect was drinking at her invitation at an Orange County Taco Bell).
77. See S.A. Harbison et al., The New Zealand DNA Databank: Its
Development and Significance as a Crime Solving Tool, 41 SCI. & JUST. 33, 36 (2001).
78. Tony Gordon, DNA Sample Links Man to Burglary, CHI. DAILY HERALD,
July 3, 2001, at 5; see also State v. Buckman, 613 N.W.2d 463, 474 (Neb. 2000)
(retention and testing of two cigarettes that a validly arrested suspect smoked at the
police station gave rise to no meritorious Fourth Amendment objection because
defendant abandoned the cigarettes).
79. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-3-1104.7(1)(a) (1999 & West
Supp. 2002) ("Genetic information is the unique property of the individual to whom the
information pertains."). The language is patterned after a model "Genetic Privacy Act"
prepared and promoted by a group at Boston University. See, e.g., George i. Annas,
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In this context, the meaning of "ownership" is opaque."0 If I am struck
by an automobile on a public street and bleed on the crosswalk, then
does that mean that I can prevent everyone else from taking a few drops
or demand that the blood be returned by the street sweeper who wipes it
up?
Even if one accepts the proposition that a DNA sample which is left
in a public place, or its profile, is in some sense the property of the
individual from whom it originated, the Fourth Amendment does not bar
the state from acquiring it."1 If a robber being pursued by the police
drops the keys to his apartment but outruns the police, they may pick up
the keys, and the state may use them to show that a person who later is
apprehended is indeed the robber who eluded capture. Similarly, shed
DNA constitutionally can be taken to the laboratory, analyzed, and the
profile placed in a database.8 2
2. RELINQUISHED DNA
Nearly 300 million DNA samples sit in tissue repositories in the
United States. 3 Police agencies under public and political pressure to
remove a serial killer from the streets will, in time, seek access to these
Genetic Privacy, in TECHNOLOGY OF JUSTICE, supra note *; Patricia (Winnie) Roche et
al., The Genetic Privacy Act: A Proposal for National Legislation, 37 JURIMETRICS J. 1,
2-9 (1996).
80. The discussion in Annas, supra note 79, only heightens the mystery.
Annas writes that without a property-rights statute,
the law is that you don't own your DNA, but everybody else can own and
use your DNA for commercial purposes except you. That can't possibly be
right .... We have laws against the purchase and sale of human organs, and
it's going to turn out that human DNA is going to be much more important,
both medically and personally than human organs are. I don't think that can
be sustained.
Id. Such passages fail to clarify the "property" in question. Is it the molecules from
human cells? Physical copies of those molecules, or copies of useful parts of them?
Abstract representations of the molecules in the form of sequence data? Patents on
human genes which would require an understanding of their functions? Which of these
putative forms of property is an individual not allowed to own when everyone else is? If
the concern is privacy of information about the individual, why change the common law
as it applies to all body parts? See, e.g., HUMAN DNA: LAW AND POLICY,
INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES (Bartha Maria Knoppers ed., 1997).
81. Imwinkelried & Kaye, supra note 58, at 438-40.
82. It could be argued, however, that analysis at loci that relate to socially
significant characteristics rather than the loci that have only biometric significance
should be treated as a search that requires a warrant and probable cause. Cf. Patterson
v. State, 742 N.E.2d 4, 10 n.3 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (noting privacy concerns associated
with such loci).
83. 1 NAT'L BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM'N, RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN
BIOLOGICAL MATERIALS: ETHICAL ISSUES AND POLICY GUIDANCE 13 (1999).
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samples, not just for specific investigations, but also to include profiles
of them in law enforcement databanks. Here too, a respectable
argument can be made that, for better or worse, the Constitution poses
no serious barrier. In United States v. Miller,84 the Supreme Court held
that when a person voluntarily relinquishes checks and deposit slips to a
bank, subpoenas requiring the bank to produce these materials do not
intrude "into any area in which [the defendant] had a protected Fourth
Amendment interest."85  Are medical records any different? Lower
courts have reached conflicting results,86 but Miller is not easily
distinguished.87
In sum, under existing doctrine, the Fourth Amendment is quite
porous to determined efforts by police to acquire the DNA of specific
individuals and of large classes of individuals. If police are thought
likely to abuse this power, legislation to limit such investigative efforts
is called for. However, the true privacy interest in one's DNA
identification profile is thin. 8 With our whole DNA (not just the
identification profile) so accessible to law enforcement, in law and in
fact, it is prudent to ask whether our privacy interest in that DNA would
be better protected by deliberate, careful creation of a population-wide
database of DNA identification profiles. As we discuss in Part III, such
a database could be unrelated to medical or other records of our affairs,
and it could be confined exclusively to the state's investigation of crime,
natural disasters, and missing persons.
III. THE PROSPECT OF UNIVERSALITY
A. One Possible Path to a Population-Wide Database
Creating a national identification database all at once would be
prohibitively expensive today, even if we had the laboratory capacity to
do it. But DNA typing technology is advancing at a pace reminiscent of
Moore's Law for microprocessor capacity that has made the "personal
computer" a fixture on every desk. 9 Soon it will be feasible to create a
84. 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
85. Id. at 440.
86. Imwinkelried & Kaye, supra note 58, at 431-34.
87. See id.
88. See supra Parts I.B, III.B.2.
89. In 1965, Gordon Moore observed that each new microprocessor chip
contains roughly twice as much capacity as its predecessor, and each chip was released
within 18 to 24 months of the previous chip. To date, "Moore's law" has remained
surprisingly accurate. See Intel Silicon: Moore's Law, at
http://www.intel.com/research/silicon/mooreslaw.htm (last visited May 8, 2003);
Laying Down the Law, TECH. REV., May 2001, at 65. Prospects for miniaturizing
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DNA identification record for everyone, at least prospectively. For
example, it would be easy to extract identification profiles as an adjunct
to public health programs that for many years have screened blood
samples from almost all newborns, to identify infants with treatable
genetic diseases.9" The identification profiles could be transmitted to a
single, secure, national database. To the extent that additional sampling
would be necessary-to include immigrants or citizens born abroad, for
example-these samples could be destroyed after they are typed. In
fact, an instrument could be built that would extract an identifying
profile and destroy the sample at the same time. Proper procedures for
sampling the DNA, extracting the identifying profile, and immediately
destroying the sample would protect everyone's genetic privacy.
The loci used for those identification profiles would be limited to
sequences that have no relationship to health or other physical or mental
traits and propensities. As discussed above, each profile would be a set
of digits devoid of any special meaning, comparable to a social security
or passport number. Access to the database would be limited to law
enforcement personnel investigating specific crimes in which DNA trace
evidence already has been found. Law enforcement agencies would not
need-and should not be permitted-to handle, much less retain, the
samples.
A system of this sort would resemble, to the greatest extent
possible, a digitalized collection of identifying features very much like
ordinary fingerprints. However, it would be far more useful in
deterring potential offenses, in generating investigative leads, and in
exonerating the innocent. 9' There would be no need to resort to
inefficient "DNA dragnets" of entire neighborhoods, as have been
conducted in California, Florida, Louisiana, Michigan, New York, and
elsewhere9 or to infer probable racial or ethnic status, as some
systems for DNA analysis have been described as equally revolutionary. See Deirdre R.
Meldrum & Mark R. Holl, Microscale Bioanalytical Systems, 297 SCIENCE 1197 (2002).
90. See Phil Reilly, Legal and Public Policy Issues in DNA Forensics, 2
NATURE REVS. 313, 315 (2001). Public health service programs for newborn screening
reach practically all children born in the United States. See, e.g., Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention, National Center for Environmental Health, Division of
Laboratory Sciences, Newborn Screening, at
http://www.cdc.gov/nceh/dls/newbornscreening.htm (last modified Apr. 23, 2003).
91. On the last point, see Akhil Reed Amar, A Safe Intrusion, AM. LAW., June
11, 2001, at 69. See also Akhil Reed Amar, Foreword: The Document and the
Doctrine, 114 HARV. L. REV. 26, 126 (2000) [hereinafter Amar, Foreword: The
Document and the Doctrine].
92. See Halbfinger, supra note 52; Leonard, supra note 52; Philip P. Pan, Pr.
George's Chief Has Used Serial Testing Before; Farrell Oversaw DNA Sampling of
2,300 in Fla., WASH. POST, Jan. 31, 1998, at B.
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observers fear.93 Not only would a comprehensive database be valuable
for public safety purposes, but it also could also be useful in identifying
bodily remains in mass disasters or other tragedies and in returning
missing persons to their families.94
Despite the understandable concerns over the privacy implications
of all DNA databases, 95 we believe that a properly designed and
93. See supra note 58.
94. Of course, one can attempt to obtain DNA samples from a missing person's
belongings or relatives, but these ad hoc efforts can be agonizing and expensive,
especially in cases of mass destruction. See David W. Chen, Grim Scavenger Hunt for
DNA Drags On for Sept. 11 Families, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2002, at Al (reporting that
"[alfter Sept. 11, thousands of items were collected from families who lost relatives in
the World Trade Center attack, in a hurried and often scattershot effort to help identify
remains," but."the New York City medical examiner's office says that more than half of
the possible DNA samples it has received are inadequate to make such matches" and
"[a]s a result, hundreds of families must repeat an ordeal they never thought they would
have to endure again: another round of the cruelly intimate search for traces of those
gone forever").
95. See Barry Steinhardt, ACLU Presentation on Privacy and Forensic DNA
Data Banks, in TECHNOLOGY OF JUSTICE, supra note *. Although we share the ACLU's
concern for privacy, its description of the defects of current database laws is
exaggerated. "For instance, the ACLU's assertion that twenty-four states allow DNA
samples, which have been collected only for law enforcement identification, to be used
for a variety of other non-law enforcement purposes" is plainly wrong. The ACLU
points to a Massachusetts statute as a leading example, characterizing it as one that
"contains an open-ended authorization for any disclosure that is, or may be, required as
a condition of federal funding and allows for the disclosure of information . . . for
'advancing other humanitarian purposes."' In fact, the Massachusetts statute explicitly
forbids the disclosure of DNA samples for such purposes. It makes it a crime to
purposely disclose "a DNA sample or record or portion thereof contained in the state
DNA database ...in any manner to any person or agency not authorized to receive
such record." MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 22E § 12 (1996 & Supp. 2002).
Massachusetts defines a "DNA record" as "DNA information that is derived from a
DNA sample." Id. § 1. The authorizations for disclosures for "federal grants or
funding" and "humanitarian purposes" pertain only to "records." Id. § 10(c), (d)(4).
The state is forbidden from releasing samples for these purposes. See Landry v.
Attorney General, 709 N.E.2d 1085, 1096 (Mass. 1999). Many other states also
distinguish between "records" and "samples." Davina Dana Bressler, Criminal DNA
Databank Statutes and Medical Research, 43 JURIMETRICS J. 51, 51 (2002). Because the
CODIS "records" are digital data (comparable to a passport number) that reveal
essentially nothing about an individual's genetic make-up, it is misleading to confuse
provisions that permit disclosure of database records with those that allow disclosure of
databank samples.
This failure to distinguish between samples and identifying records (and among
types of research that can be undertaken with either databank samples or database
records) appears frequently among arguments against inclusive databases. For example,
Peter Neufeld reported that although he was
not the source of the count, . . . [i]n about fifteen of the fifty states, the
statutes expressly permit that the databanks which are being created for law
enforcement purposes can be used for research purposes in putting medical
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administered national database might well be the best solution to the
coverage question. It would entail but a limited intrusion on individual
freedom and privacy while advancing both public safety and racial even-
handedness in the criminal justice system and serving as a firewall
against far greater intrusions on privacy by law enforcement authorities
pawing through medical and other records looking for a "match" to
DNA found at the scenes of notorious crimes. We began with no
enthusiasm for the idea of an inclusive national database, but the more
we considered the drawbacks of the likely alternatives and the
plausibility of procedures for database creation that would limit the
government's access to sensitive genetic information, the more we found
it to be a viable policy choice.96 To explain our conclusion, we survey
the arguments that have been made against a national database, then
consider in more detail the advantages it offers over the current system.
B. Opposition to a Population-Wide Database
1. PUBLIC ACCEPTANCE
Opponents of broad DNA databases sometimes suggest that it is
pointless to consider a population-wide database because the public
research, humanitarian needs and what have you. And so there is no
restriction on the kinds of research that can be used under the umbrella of
the law enforcement function.
Peter Neufeld, Panel Discussion, Conference on DNA and the Criminal Justice System
(Nov. 21, 2000) (transcript available at http://www.dnapolicy.net/dna/videos/transi.htm)
(apparently relying on Kimmelman, supra note 10). But Dr. Kimmelman asserts only
that "[alnother fifteen states allow release of records for research." Id. at 212 (emphasis
added).
96. We find it impossible to be anything but appalled at the prospect of
government or others-perhaps others, more than government-possessing everyone's
genome, and able to peer into and analyze at leisure the genetic code that can give up
secrets we do not even know we have. This is the prospect that turns debate from the
method of DNA sample collection to the uses made of the samples. We could not favor
authorizing a more inclusive DNA database, much less a comprehensive one, unless its
creation were coupled with transparent procedures to assure destruction of whatever
tissue samples are used, once the non-phenotypic loci useful only for identification have
been typed and their profile has been recorded. But we foresee technology soon being
available that would permit destruction of a sample almost simultaneously with its profile
being recorded, and we can specify procedures that would keep whole DNA out of law
enforcement control when only an identification profile is transmitted to an identification
database by a hospital or other agency which routinely analyzes samples for health or
other non-law enforcement purposes. Similarly, we could not favor secondary analysis
for the identification loci, of DNA sampled for other purposes-by health authorities, for
example-unless transparent procedures assured that the samples themselves would be
kept out of law enforcement's control.
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opposes it.97 They note that in the 1940s, Congress did not adopt
proposed legislation providing for universal fingerprinting and identity
cards.9" Since the American public today regards DNA with a mixture
of suspicion, horror, and awe, it is said a population-wide DNA
database is too far from popular acceptance to be worth considering.99
However, a database constructed in the manner we have described offers
pronounced advantages over the present system of incremental
expansions of law enforcement databases. The prospect should not be
dismissed on the basis of surmises about public opinion, for public
opinion is a fickle master and an unreliable determinant of future
policy.' 0 Certainly, public opinion has undergone sea changes on issues
such as sexual mores, narcotics and the use of alcohol and tobacco,
capital punishment, and gun control. The public has heard virtually no
serious debate about the desirability or noxiousness of a population-wide
97. See, e.g., Neufeld, supra note 95 ("[T]he argument frankly is that most
people in the country are not in favor of the universal databank.").
98. The fingerprint and identity card bills were the following: Citizen
Identification Act of 1943, H.R. 601, 79th Cong. (1945) (requiring every citizen more
than eleven years of age to appear, be fingerprinted, give information under oath, and
carry an identity card); Citizen Identification Act of 1943, S. 1191, 78th Cong. (1943)
(same); Citizen Identification Act of 1942, H.R. 6256, 77th Cong. (1941) (requiring
every citizen more than fifteen years of age to appear, be fingerprinted, give information
under oath, and carry an identity card); Universal Fingerprinting Act of 1941, H.R.
3157, 77th Cong. (1941) (requiring every person in or entering the United States to be
fingerprinted); cf. Alien Identification Act of 1942, H.R. 6258, 77th Cong. (1941)
(requiring every alien in the United States to appear, be fingerprinted, give information
under oath, and carry an identity card).
99. Neufeld, supra note 95 ("[A] majority of this population in this country
would oppose a universal database even if in the universal database they only looked at
the 13 STR markers and then destroyed the sample."); cf. Peter Neufeld, Address at
the Electronic Freedom Frontier Conference: Who's in Your Genes? (Mar. 19, 1992)
(available at http://www.eff.org/pub/Privacy/Medical/cfp2_genepanel.transcript)
(suggesting that few people would "would be in favor of a law that would require each
of you to donate a sample of your DNA, your children's DNA, and your loved ones'
DNA into a national data bank controlled by police, which ...might mean access to
employers, insurers, or other social scientists or research scientists"). These assertions
apparently rest on personal impressions rather than actual data.
100. Even today, the true state of public opinion is unclear. What people would
favor depends greatly on how the proposal is framed and what information they have
before them. Already, there is advocacy for a population-wide database in the United
States and in other liberal democracies. See Akhil Reed Amar, A Search for Justice in
Our Genes, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2002, at A31; Martin Evison, DNA Database Could
End Problem of Identity Fraud, 420 NATURE 359 (2002); Amar, Foreword: The
Document and the Doctrine, supra note 91; Akhil Reed Amar, Editorial, The
Government Should Require a DNA Sample, But Keep it Private, FULTON COUNTY
DAILY REP., June 21, 2001; Michael E. Smith et al., DNA Data Would Combat Crime,
Racism, USA TODAY, July 26, 2001, at 15A.
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database. Until this debate takes place, we should not shy away from
examining the merits and demerits of even the most expansive database.
2. CONSTITUTIONALITY
A second argument against pursuit of a population-wide database is
that even if it were popular, it would be unconstitutional. The most
powerful constitutional challenge flows from the Fourth Amendment
requirement that government "searches" be "reasonable," which the
Supreme Court has interpreted to require a judicial warrant based on
probable cause, unless the search lies within one of the "specifically
established and well-delineated exceptions" to the warrant
requirement."' Yet, in some respects, a population-wide database such
as we have described would be easier to defend under Supreme Court
precedent than conventional convicted-offender databases.
For both practices, a threshold question is whether the
acquisition of DNA would even amount to a "search" within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment. There is no doubt that blood
samples taken from infants by governmental edict would "constitute
searches of 'persons,' and depend antecedently upon seizures of
'persons.""" But what if the DNA were acquired by applying a sticky
pad to the infant's skin to acquire some exfoliating, epidermal cells
without even a scratch? Would the reduced level of bodily invasion and
the fact that these cells are constantly exposed to the public and being
shed from the surface of the body lead a court to hold that no search is
involved? In Palmer v. State,'°3 the Indiana Supreme Court reasoned
that the warrantless acquisition of defendant's fingerprints during his
trial did not constitute a seizure forbidden by the Fourth Amendment
because "fingerprints are an identifying factor readily available to the
world at large."' 4 Other courts have held that shining an ultraviolet
lamp on a suspect's skin to expose chemicals transferred from stolen
money is not a search.'05
One might hope that the Supreme Court's latest encounter with
defining a "search" in Kyllo v. United States,"°6 would clarify the
101. See, e.g., Florida v. White, 526 U.S. 559, 568 (1999).
102. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966) (referring to blood
samples taken from a driver being treated in a hospital for injuries received in an
automobile accident).
103. 679 N.E.2d 887 (Ind. 1997).
104. Id. at 891.
105. E.g., United States v. Richardson, 388 F.2d 842, 845 (6th Cir. 1968).
However, this is probably the minority view. See People v. Santistevan, 715 P.2d 792
(Colo. 1986); State v. Hardaway, 36 P.3d 900 (Mont. 2001).
106. 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
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viability of this "public exposure" theory. In Kyllo, a federal agent used
an infrared detector to find that "the roof over the garage and a side wall
of petitioner's home were relatively hot compared to the rest of the
home and substantially warmer than neighboring homes in the
triplex."0 7 "Based on tips from informants, utility bills, and the thermal
imaging, a federal magistrate judge issued a warrant authorizing a
search of [Kyllo's] home, and the agents found an indoor growing
operation involving more than 100 plants." 08 Before trial, Kyllo moved
to suppress the evidence on the ground that the thermal imaging required
a warrant.0 9 When the motion was denied, he entered a conditional
guilty plea and appealed."' The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
ultimately affirmed, reasoning that the defendant had neither a subjective
nor an objectively reasonable expectation that "amorphous 'hot spots' on
the roof and exterior wall" would go unobserved."' In other words,
according to the court of appeals, there was no "search."
A sharply divided Supreme Court reversed. At first blush, this
reversal seems to undermine the view that inspecting materials on the
surface of the body is not a search. After all, if the use of an instrument
to capture infrared rays coming from the surface of a house is a search,
it might seem that so is the use of an instrument to capture and analyze
DNA on the surface of the body.
The rationale of Kyllo, however, is quite limited. Justice Scalia's
opinion for a majority of five Justices looks to the historically
recognized zone of privacy in which government surveillance is
prohibited. Apparently assuming that eighteenth century constables
would have had to enter the house to detect heat sources-a trespass that
is the very paradigm of a search-the majority announced that the
infrared scan also was a search. As the Court put it, "obtaining by
sense-enhancing technology any information regarding the interior of the
home that could not otherwise have been obtained without physical
'intrusion into a constitutionally protected area,' constitutes a search-at
least where, as here, the technology in question is not in general public
use.""' In other words, Kyllo establishes no more than that the use of
technology that is functionally equivalent to trespassing into a home to
acquire information is a search. This result, the Court suggested, was
necessary for "the preservation of that degree of privacy against
107. Id. at 30.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
Il1. Id. at 31.
112. Id. at 34.
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government that existed when the Fourth Amendment was adopted. 11 3
To hold otherwise, the majority insisted, would "permit police
technology to erode the privacy [originally] guaranteed by the Fourth
Amendment...."4
In contrast, the Fourth Amendment's protections against searches
(as opposed to seizures) of the person lack "roots deep in the common
law . . .""' As the Schmerber Court observed, in "dealing with
intrusions into the human body rather than with state interferences with
property relationships or private papers-'houses, papers, and effects'-
we write on a clean slate.""..6 Therefore, Kyllo's functional equivalence
test does not dictate the conclusion that it is a "search" to take from the
surface of a person's skin cells that are constantly being shed and to
analyze the DNA they contain. Unlike infrared scanning that, in effect,
places the police in the interior of a house, DNA sampling and analysis
are not functionally equivalent to any eighteenth century practice
proscribed by the Fourth Amendment.
Even so, the sensitive nature of some of the information locked in
the helices of the DNA molecule leads us to believe that DNA sampling
is a Fourth Amendment search, even if the sample is obtained
noninvasively." 7 Our point here, however, is simply that the question is
far from settled. Certainly, Kyllo does not dictate the outcome.
The same can be said of the next question in any Fourth
Amendment analysis: If sampling DNA is a search, is it constitutionally
"reasonable"? The reasonableness standard might well permit
construction of a system such as we have described. Taking DNA from
newborns who are already in the hospital where their DNA is routinely
sampled does not detain them and would involve no additional search.
With analysis at suitable loci, the extracted profile could be used only
for identification." 8 The Court's opinions in Edmond and Ferguson"9
are less of a barrier here than they are to arrestee DNA databases. The
primary purpose of acquiring the DNA samples from newborns always
has been, and would remain, screening for treatable genetic conditions
113. Id.
114. Id
115. Id.
116. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 767-78.
117. Kaye, supra note 1, at 482.
118. An important qualification must be noted. Even loci on autosomal
chromosomes that are noncoding and unlinked to genes that are related to diseases or
behaviors are inherited as Mendelian traits. Consequently, records in a database that
includes parents and their children could be examined to test parentage. Unwanted
discovery of illegitimacy would constitute an obvious and real invasion of personal and
familial privacy.
119. See supra Part II.A.2.B.
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such as Phenylketonuria (PKU). And, even if the "primary purpose"
were taken to be normal law enforcement, the argument advanced
earlier for a new exception to the warrant requirement would apply.
121
A "biometric exception" would be less problematic than other
exceptions, such as the "automobile exception," that have become
fixtures of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
How these questions ultimately will be resolved is exceedingly
difficult to predict. Perhaps the Constitution forbids government typing
for identification purposes the DNA of anyone not convicted of a crime,
or of anyone not arrested. Perhaps not. At this time, we simply cannot
be sure that the Fourth Amendment guarantees that the line will be
drawn at conviction, or even at arrest. Those who fear law-enforcement
control of a DNA identification database unless it is predicated on
conviction or arrest may need to seek more predictable protection than
the Fourth Amendment. A comprehensive database will not come into
existence if the general public comes to a clear and stable view that it is
worth sacrificing the public safety and racial-justice advantages of a
comprehensive DNA identification database, in order to limit possible
state intrusions on our privacy and autonomy. Nonetheless, if the
general public is ambivalent; if it remains uninformed about the likely
consequences of pursuing or repudiating a comprehensive database; if
the questions are not taken up in public and political discourse; or if
false confidence is placed in a prediction about the future course of
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, then it is as likely as not that the
nation will find itself, in time, with a near-universal DNA database that
is more threatening to privacy than the one described here." 1
120. Cf. Amar, Foreword: the Document and the Doctrine, supra note 91, at
126 (suggesting that a universal DNA database would be permissible under a
reasonableness inquiry "as defined by the values of the rest of the Constitution" but that
"it is far from clear that current doctrine would allow this scheme, because it
contemplates intrusions for criminal law-enforcement purposes in the absence of ...
individualized suspicion ... a category of search that doctrine strongly disfavors").
121. More threatening because the vast collection of DNA samples and analyses
held by hospitals, HMOs, and their corporate relatives, and the increasing digitization of
those records, is generating a comprehensive DNA database which, though not ideally
constructed for forensic use, is not really off-limits to law enforcement. If law
enforcement authorities are not authorized to create a comprehensive database of DNA
identification profiles, investigators will look to other databases when the offender-only
database yields no "match" to DNA found at the scene of particularly notorious
crimes-serial sexual assaults and homicides in particular. There, they will find
identified whole DNA and DNA profiles of various kinds, linked to complete medical
files containing a wealth of intensely private information. See Lawrence 0. Gostin,
Health Information Privacy, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 451, 463-70, 491-92 (1995).
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3. NATION OF SUSPECTS
A third objection is that a universal database would constitute a
"step toward an Orwellian society""' that will make "us a 'nation of
suspects,' and radically alter[] the relationship between the citizen and
government." '  "Storing information on otherwise unsuspected
individuals," it is said, "expresses an ethos of suspicion."24 As
rhetoric, this is powerful stuff, but its substance is fluffier. Privacy is
an important value, but the privacy threat from digital records of DNA
types that reveal nothing about a person's nature or status is not self-
evident. Certainly, it bears no resemblance to George Orwell's dystopia
in which the state monitored every conversation and action, and
responded to mere thoughts of disloyalty with profound "re-education."
Establishing a system that has the ability to link individuals to crime
scenes to the greatest possible extent without probing their minds or
invading their homes or possessions does not make everyone a "suspect"
in any meaningful or problematic sense. Indeed, a population-wide
database should quickly limit the number of suspects-typically to a
single person-in many crimes. By promptly eliminating everyone else
as a viable suspect, it would reduce the burden on many individuals who
would have been primary suspects.
4. LOSS OF ANONYMITY
"Privacy" is a protean term that encompasses a heterogeneous set
of interests. It is not privacy in general that is put at risk when the state
has an ability to match found DNA with a profile retained in an
identification database. It is not even autonomy. Rather, DNA
databases threaten three forms of anonymity.
122. Jean E. McEwen, Sherlock Holmes Meets Genetic Fingerprinting, BOSTON
COLL. L. SCH. MAG., Spring 1994, at 44, 49.
123. George Annas, Privacy Rules for DNA Databanks: Protecting Coded
'Future Diaries', 270 JAMA 2346, 2347 (1993) (citation omitted); Jean E. McEwen,
DNA Databanks, in GENETIC SECRETS: PROTECTING PRIVACY AND CONFIDENTIALITY IN
THE GENETIC ERA, supra note 56, at 236 ("[A] population-wide DNA data bank could
fundamentally alter the relationship between individuals and the state, essentially turning
us into a nation of suspects.").
124. Jonathan Kimmelman, The Promise and Perils of Criminal DNA
Databanking, 18 NATURE BIOTECH. 695, 696 (2000); cf. Kimmelman, supra note 10, at
215 (complaining that "[a]n overly expansive and mandatory DNA databanking scheme
injures the trust relationship between a government and its subjects").
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a. Temporal anonymity
There is a largely unspoken assumption, deeply rooted in American
history and culture, that if we are moved to do so, it is possible for us to
leave the past behind and to re-invent ourselves in another place. But
this seems a romantic, unrealistic prospect today. The lives we lead
leave a trail in medical records, in credit card records, in school
records, in employment files-in any records that link to our social
security numbers, drivers' license numbers, and the like. We can be
found if the state, or anyone with means, really cares to find us. No
doubt, biometric identifiers, from fingerprints to facial recognition
systems, iris scans to DNA profiles, make it harder to transform one's
identity. But anonymity in the sense of recreating one's identity-of
riding into town, as it were, to start a new life without carrying the
weight of the past-is a quixotism.125
b. Conduct anonymity
There is a second sense of anonymity that is often worth
protecting-the anonymity of those engaged in certain types of desirable
conduct. The ability to act anonymously may be personally or socially
valuable in contexts such as making charitable donations, expressing
unpopular opinions, or informing authorities of wrongdoing or
dangerous situations. Consequently, we sometimes protect such
anonymity as a right guaranteed by the Constitution.2 6 or as a privilege
125. Witness protection programs are an exception, but the government's ability
to protect witness from retaliation by offering them new identities would not be
compromised by a governmental database of DNA profiles.
126. Watchtower Bible and Tract Soc'y of N.Y., Inc. v. Vill. of Stratton, 536
U.S. 150, 153, 166-69, 171 (2002) (holding that ordinance requiring individuals to
obtain a permit prior to engaging in door-to-door advocacy and to display upon demand
the permit, containing one's name, violated the First Amendment as it applied to
religious proselytizing, anonymous political speech, and the distribution of handbills);
Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., Inc., 525 U.S. 182, 187, 205 (1999)
(holding that statute requiring that initiative-petition circulators wear identification
badges bearing the circulator's name violated First Amendment, as did statute requiring
that proponents of an initiative report names and addresses of all paid circulators);
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 337, 356-57 (1995) (holding that a
state's prohibition against the distribution of any anonymous campaign literature violated
the First Amendment); Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 63-65 (1960) (invalidating a
city ordinance prohibiting all anonymous leafleting); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S.
449, 460-66 (1958) (holding that order requiring association to produce records
including names and addresses of all members and agents violated the right to freedom
of association). But see United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 623-26 (1954)
(upholding disclosure requirements for lobbyists).
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codified by statute"' or established by common law.'28  But a
population-wide DNA identification database maintained for law
enforcement purposes would not interfere with those protections.
In other situations, conduct anonymity is an enemy of public safety.
It is a rare offender who expects to be identified and apprehended when
he or she commits a crime. If witnesses to offenses do not recognize the
offenders, the offenders will likely elude apprehension. Knowing this, a
person bent on crime who is anonymous in a place where the
opportunity presents itself is undeterred. Conversely, there is no special
trick to apprehending a burglar, a robber, or a hit-and-run driver (or
deterring an otherwise motivated offender) whose name can be given to
police by a passerby. To the extent that a comprehensive DNA
identification database merely reduces anonymity for criminal conduct,
it infringes no interest worthy of protection.
c. Spatial anonymity
There is a particular form of conduct anonymity that is valued by
nearly everyone in our culture, and is likely to remain so. It is spatial
anonymity-the ability to keep one's movements and location
confidential. Spatial anonymity is not threatened by all biometric
identification systems, but it is threatened by systems that can link
individuals to particular locations. The shadowy figure disappearing
into the London fog and the nondescript face lost among many in the
crowd are anonymous. The ability to be at a particular place and time
without revealing one's identity is vital to criminal enterprises; but
ordinary individuals want to be free to visit a friend, enter a store, or
take a drive into the country without being tracked by the government.
Pervasive government surveillance that tracks one's locations at all times
of the day and night would strip us of the "breathing room" in which
our liberty takes shape-we require a private sphere of action in which
to be ourselves, free from observation.
127. See, e.g., ROBERT D. SACK, LIBEL, SLANDER, AND RELATED PROBLEMS, at
app. 3 (3d ed. 2002) (reproducing these statutes); David A. Anderson, Freedom of the
Press, 80 TEX. L. REV. 429, 487 (2002) (reporting that "[i]n more than half of the
states, shield statutes give representatives of the press ... at least a qualified privilege to
refuse to disclose confidential sources").
128. See, e.g., Senear v. Daily Journal-Am., 641 P.2d 1180, 1181-83 (1982)
(common-law reporter's shield privilege); EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, THE NEW
WIGMORE: EVIDENTIARY PRIVILEGES § 7.3 (2002) (government's privilege to keep the
identity of an informant confidential); 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT
COMMON LAW § 2374(f) (John T. McNaughton rev. 1961) (1904) (same); cf. N.M. CT.
R. EVID. 11-514 (1982) (establishing a reporter's shield privilege by court rule).
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Nevertheless, a population-wide DNA identification database would
not destroy all spatial anonymity-the confidentiality of one's
movements could be preserved-since it is not feasible to reconstruct a
person's travels by looking at DNA molecules. A comprehensive DNA
identification database would not present the potential "abuse" of
"twenty-four hour surveillance of any citizen" that gave the Supreme
Court momentary pause in the course of holding that the use of a radio
beeper to track a car to the defendant's house did not even rise to the
level of a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 2 9 Still,
the fact remains that it is technologically possible for a determined
search for remnants of hair, saliva, or other DNA-bearing material to
uncover traces of many peoples' DNA at crime scenes or other
locations. For instance, there will be a loss of anonymity if and when
police are able to deduce, from these biological traces, all the people
who frequented the bedroom of the deceased. This power to reconstruct
past events, however partially, will be invaluable to criminal
investigators, but it must be recognized that it diminishes our spatial
anonymity-the privacy of our movements-by reducing our ability to
enter bedrooms or other embarrassing locations without risk of our
presence there later being discovered.
5. EXPENSE
A final objection to a population-wide database is that it would not
be worth the cost-which might be thought to be immense. These costs
would include the capital investment in biochemical and electronic
devices for collecting, analyzing, storing, and accessing the data as well
as the labor cost of police and other personnel who would be needed to
build and operate the system. However, these costs could be kept to a
minimum with technology that types the identification loci at the same
time that neonatal disease screening is done and uploads the biometric
identification data to the national DNA identification database without
law enforcement personnel ever possessing or even handling the DNA
itself.
The marginal cost of creating DNA identification records in such a
system would not be zero, but it would be small. Suppose that the cost
129. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 283 (1983). The Court reasoned
that "[a] person traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable
expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to another." Id. at 281; cf.
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 741 (1979) (holding that recording the telephone
numbers dialed by a criminal suspect with a "pen register" in the telephone company's
office infringes no legitimate expectation of privacy in the numbers dialed on the
telephone).
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of the additional DNA testing for law enforcement was one dollar per
sample, and that the marginal cost of operating the larger database was
twenty-five cents per sample. At present, some four million babies are
born every year in the United States. Even unrealistically assuming that
population growth were to double the annual number of births by the
time a decision to implement the comprehensive database were made,
the cost would be on the order of $10 million per year. Admittedly,
marginal cost projections of this sort are speculative and could be quite
optimistic. But if the actual costs were twenty times as great, 3 ' the
annual marginal cost of the system would be $200 million, a cost that
would be offset by savings as (1) the need to collect and analyze samples
from convicted offenders diminishes; (2) expensive, area-wide, consent-
based searches in notorious cases become unnecessary; and (3) more
cases are resolved by database searches that cut the time of labor-
intensive detective work. Considering that Congress has authorized
hundreds of millions of dollars to help states process DNA evidence, the
incremental cost of assembling a population-wide database prospectively
is not obviously excessive. However, the cost-benefit judgment requires
some attention to the hard-to-monetize benefits in crime reduction and
racial equality that a comprehensive national database would bring. We
turn, then, to the advantages associated with a population-wide DNA
database.
C. Advantages of a Population-Wide Database
The current approach to creating law enforcement databases focuses
exclusively on individuals' contacts with the criminal justice system.
When a criminal conviction, an arrest, or a stop by traffic or foot patrol
is the trigger for sampling a person's DNA, profiling it, and retaining
that profile in a database for use in future criminal investigations, the
database will be racially skewed and will fall far short of the full
potential of this technology to exonerate innocent suspects, to identify
the guilty, to protect victims of crime, and to assist in the identification
of missing persons. 3'
130. Cf. How Effectively are States and Federal Agencies Working Together to
Implement the Use of New DNA Technologies?: Hearing Before the House Subcomm. on
Gov't Efficiency, Fin. Mgnt. and Intergovernmental Relations, 107th Cong. 115 (2001)
(statement of Jamie Downs, Director, Chief Medical Examiner, Alabama Department of
Forensic Science) (noting that the average current cost of processing a CODIS sample is
$25).
131. At least one state already encourages parents to obtain and store samples of
their children's blood (at their own expense) in case the child is murdered or mutilated
beyond recognition. See Florida Tries Using DNA Sampling to Protect Children, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 27, 1999, at A14.
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1. EFFICACY
Those who insist that it is sufficient to record the DNA profiles of
felons are, perhaps without realizing it, proposing to sacrifice most of
the preventative and investigative force of the technology. As explained
in Part I, the justification put forward for making felony conviction the
threshold for amassing DNA profiles is that the likelihood of further
felony offenses is especially elevated among those once before convicted
of a felony. However, 62% of those arrested and prosecuted for a
felony have no prior felony conviction.132 Furthermore, among those
arrested and prosecuted for serious felonies, those arrested and
prosecuted for rape are the least likely to have a prior felony conviction
of any kind-only about 30% have such a prior record, as compared to
almost 50% for burglary.133 A DNA database cannot deter or lead to
apprehension before a profile is included in the database. Therefore, a
convicted-felon database is of no help in deterring or investigating
felonies committed by persons not previously convicted of a felony-and
they are a majority of those now arrested on felony charges.
Moving the criterion for database inclusion back, to felony arrests
or to arrests of any type, still excludes those responsible for a major
proportion of all felony offenses. Of those arrested and prosecuted for
serious felonies, 44% have never before been arrested on a felony
charge; and about one-third carry no arrest record at all. 134
Thus, substantial public safety benefits would likely flow from
investment in a population-wide database. We know that many
offenders commit other crimes-sometimes many other crimes-before
they are first convicted. We also know that from 1993 through 1998,
when Virginia's convicted-offender database had less than 30,000
samples, it generated between 0 and 13 hits per year. In 2002, with
nearly 190,000 samples, it averaged over one hit every day.' In Great
132. This is usually stated the other way: "more than half" of felony defendants
have prior "felony records" and "two-thirds have prior arrests." See, e.g., BRIAN A.
REAVES, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, FELONY DEFENDANTS IN LARGE URBAN
COUNTIES, 1994, Executive Summary, at 2 (1998) (reporting that "[albout two-thirds of
all defendants had been arrested previously . . . .Fifty-six percent of defendants had a
felony arrest record," and an "estimated 38% of defendants had at least one prior
conviction for a felony").
133. See id. at 1 tbl.(Felony arrest and conviction record of felony defendants in
the 75 largest counties 1994). Not surprisingly, in light of those data, half of those
imprisoned after felony conviction are going to prison for the first time. Id.
134. Id. at 2.
135. See Virginia Division of Forensic Science, DNA Databank Hits & Samples
Collected as of 12/31/2002, at http://www.dfs.state.va.us/information/whatsnew.cfm
(reporting 445 hits in 2002, when the database had grown to 188,940 profiles). The
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Britain, where the database reached 1.5 million profiles in February
2002, British criminal investigators were averaging 1,600 hits per
week.'36 Many more would result from a truly comprehensive, national
system combined with more thorough collection and prompt analysis of
crime-scene DNA. When one considers the personal and social costs of
the crimes that might be prevented, the balance might well favor the
most inclusive database.' 37
2. RACIAL JUSTICE AND THE LEGITIMACY OF LAW
There can be no doubt that any database of DNA profiles will be
dramatically skewed by race if the sampling and typing of DNA
becomes a routine consequence of criminal conviction.' 38 Without
seismic changes in Americans' behavior or in the criminal justice
system, nearly 30% of black males, but less than 5 % of white males will
be imprisoned on a felony conviction at some point in their lives.' 39
dramatic growth in cold hits over time also may reflect improvement in the acquisition
of crime-scene samples by the police.
136. See Major Tool for Crime Detection Receives Boost, M2 PRESSWIRE, Feb.
21, 2002, 2002 WL 4160490. The Home Secretary took the occasion of this milestone
to announce that "[tihere is currently more than a 70 per cent chance of a stain found at
a crime scene being matched to a name" in the U.K. national database. Id.
137. Of course, it is nearly impossible to document and quantify the net
benefits, as we cannot know how many crimes would be prevented or solved by any
given expansion of the national DNA identification database. We cannot even predict
the extent to which those who are bent on crime will try to outsmart the technology by
taking care not to leave any DNA at the scenes of their crimes or to obscure the
evidence they do leave. See Richard Willing, Criminals Try to Outwit DNA, USA
TODAY, Aug. 28, 2000, at 1.
138. States have been moving steadily in this direction. See supra note 6.
139. See THOMAS P. BONCZAR & ALLEN J. BECK, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, LIFETIME LIKELIHOOD OF GOING TO STATE OR FEDERAL PRISON (1997). The
Bureau of Justice Statistics has projected the lifetime likelihood of imprisonment, in a
state or federal prison, to be 28.5% for black males, 16% for Hispanic males, and 4.4%
for white males. Id. at 2. These projections are all based on incarceration rates in
1991, when nearly two-thirds of all men sent to prison were from African American,
Hispanic, or other minority groups. Although historically high, those imprisonment
rates remained stable between 1991 and 1995. Id. at 5. Women are less likely to be
imprisoned than men, but their projected lifetime chances of imprisonment show an
almost identically disparate distribution by race. Id. at 6.
Similar data are not available to project the lifetime likelihood of conviction by
race, but every group's lifetime likelihood of conviction will be higher than its lifetime
likelihood of imprisonment. The likelihood of conviction is probably less racially
skewed than the likelihood of imprisonment, because misdemeanor convictions are not
likely to be as skewed by race as are felony convictions (without which it is rare for a
term of imprisonment to be imposed) and because, for any given offense of conviction,
the chances of being sentenced to prison are increased by the existence and weight of the
offender's prior criminal record-and blacks are arrested and convicted more frequently
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Arrest, prosecution, and conviction are so pervasive in black
communities that, on any given day, a black American is five times
more likely to be in jail than is a white.14 An adult black male is four
times more likely to be under some form of correctional supervision,141
six-and-a-half times more likely to be incarcerated somewhere, 42 and
eight times more likely to be in prison'43 than his white counterpart.
than whites. Thus, although the prevalence of conviction would be to some degree less
racially skewed than is the prevalence of imprisonment, a gross racial imbalance would
characterize any database including those ever convicted.
140. ALLEN BECK & JENNIFER C. KARBERG, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
PRISON AND JAIL INMATES AT MIDYEAR 2000, at 7 (2001) (reporting 132 whites per
100,000 whites in the population were in local jails at midyear 2000, compared to 736
blacks per 100,000 blacks).
141. See Allen J. Beck, Trends in U.S. Correctional Populations, in THE
DILEMMAS OF CORRECTIONS: CONTEMPORARY READINGS (K.C. Haas & G.P. Alpert eds.,
4th ed. 1999) (reporting the following data, detailing the 4:1 black-to-white ratio):
Percentage of Men Under Correctional Supervision
by Race and Age, United States, 1996
Age Percent of white men Percent of black men
under supervision under supervision
18-19 4.4 16.2
20-24 8.0 29.4
25-29 7.1 28.9
30-34 5.8 24.4
34-39 4.4 17.2
40 or older 1.3 6.1
142. The Bureau of Justice Statistics reports the following data on the total
incarceration, including both jail and prison, of blacks and whites:
MALE FEMALE
Age BLACK WHITE Ratio BLACK WHITE Ratio
Group
18-19 6027 942 6.40: 1 231 71 3.25: 1
20-24 10593 1560 6.79: 1 525 137 3.38: 1
25-29 13118 1732 7.57: 1 993 187 5.31: 1
30-34 11892 1861 6.39: 1 1409 224 6.29: 1
35-39 10054 1460 6.89: 1 962 159 6.05: 1
40-44 6399 972 6.58: 1 513 87 5.90: 1
45-54 3409 553 6.16: 1 209 39 5.36: 1
55+ 635 139 4.57: 1 28 7 4.00: 1
BECK & KARBERG, supra note 140, at 9 tbl. 13 (Number of inmates in state or federal
prisons and local jails per 100,000 residents, by gender, race, Hispanic origin and age
(June 30, 2000)).
143. ALLEN J. BECK, PRISONERS IN 1999, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS 9 tbl. 14
(2000) (reporting 417 white males in state or federal prison per 100,000 white males in
the population, compared to 3,408 black male prisoners per 100,000 black males).
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Racial skewing of the DNA databases will be reduced somewhat if
the legal authority to sample and type offenders' DNA continues to
expand and comes to include the multitudes convicted of lesser, but
more numerous, felonies and misdemeanors. Racial imbalance in the
databases would be further reduced if, as leading law enforcement
leaders have urged,' 44 arrest rather than conviction becomes the occasion
for sampling DNA and including profiles in the database.' 45 But the
decrease in racial disparity would come not come from a racial parity in
arrest rates-the annual arrest rate among blacks is more than two and a
half times the white rate,'46 and a black man's lifetime chances of being
arrested are more than double a white man's.'47 Rather, expanding
144. See Kaye, supra note 1, at 458 n.12; Howard Safir, New York City Police
Commissioner, Presentation to the National Commission on the Future of DNA
Evidence (March 1, 1999) (transcript available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/
dnamtgtrans4/trans-n.html) (calling for legislation to "give us the authority to take
samples from all those arrested for fingerprintable offenses, which includes all
misdemeanors in our penal law"); Rose Marie Arce, Surveillance and DNA Testing Are
Among the Latest Police Weapons, NEWSDAY, May 30, 1999, at A17 (reporting that
"Police Commissioner Howard Safir wants to expand [DNA] testing exponentially to
include taking DNA samples from everyone arrested for 'fingerprintable' offenses [to
retain in a database of] something like bar codes"); Laylan Copelin, Allow DNA Samples
at Arrests, Officials Urge, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, June 9, 2000, at Al.
145. Removing the DNA profiles if a conviction did not follow the arrest would
reduce the effects described here. However, if the British experience is any indication,
even if legislation initially provides for such removal, in time it will transform into a
system of permanent retention.
146. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITES STATES:
2000, 12 tbl.10 (reporting 224,611,000 whites and 34,862,000 blacks in the 1999 U.S.
population); FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 1999,
230 tbl.43 (reporting 6,283,294 arrests of whites and 2,600,510 of blacks in 1999).
147. The lifetime likelihood of arrest cannot be drawn directly from routinely
collected data, but it can be projected from annual arrest statistics and from cohort
studies, in which a jurisdiction's police records are combed for contacts with anyone
born in that jurisdiction in a given year. See Alfred Blumstein, Systems Analysis and the
Criminal Justice System, 374 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. STUD. 92, 99 (1967)
(using the FBI's Uniform Crime Reports for 1965 to estimate that a city male's chances
of being arrested for a nontraffic offense some time in his life are about 50% for males,
about 60% for males living in cities, and about 90% for African American males living
in cities); Alfred Blumstein & Elizabeth Graddy, Prevalence and Recidivism Index
Arrests: A Feedback Model, 16 L. & Soc'Y REV. 265, 279-80 (1981-1982) (using
various national data sets and the Uniform Crime Reports for 1968 through 1977, to
estimate the lifetime chances of felony arrest at 51% for black males in the nation's fifty-
six largest cities, more than triple the 14% chance of felony arrest for white males
there).
The lifetime likelihood of adult felony arrest is high, particularly for urban black
males, but the likelihood of arrest is even greater when account is taken of juvenile
arrests and misdemeanor arrests-and higher again if arrests for moving violations are
included. See MARVIN WOLFGANG ET AL., DELINQUENCY IN A BIRTH COHORT 54 (1972)
(among males born in Philadelphia in 1945 who grew up there, 50% of the nonwhites
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DNA databases to include arrestees would diminish the racial disparity
by bringing many more whites into the databases-about half of all
males experience at least one misdemeanor or felony arrest in their
lifetimes. 148
Thus, although a black man's relative chance of being included in
the database would be reduced from at least four times that of a white
man's in a convicted offender database to roughly twice a white man's
in an arrestee database, about 90% of urban black males would be
included if DNA were routinely sampled on arrest. Such an "arrest-
had at least one recorded police contact for a felony or misdemeanor before turning 18,
in contrast to 29% of white males); PAUL E. TRACY ET AL., DELINQUENCY CAREERS IN
Two BIRTH COHORTS 38-40 (1990) (among males born in Philadelphia in 1958 who
grew up there, 42% of the nonwhites had felony or misdemeanor police contacts before
their 18th birthdays, in contrast to 23% of the whites); Robert Tillman, The Size of the
"Criminal Population ": The Prevalence and Incidence of Adult Arrest, 25 CRIMINOLOGY
561, 567 (1987) (finding that 65% of non-white males born in California in 1956 were
arrested there at least once in the twelve years between their 18th and 30th birthdays,
compared to 34% of white men, and that 30% of black women were arrested during that
period compared to 10% of white women); DAVID VAN ALSTYNE & VINCENT MANTI,
THE PREVALENCE AND INCIDENCE OF ARRESTS AMONG ADULT MALES IN NEW YORK
STATE 2 (N.Y. State Div. of Criminal Justices Services, 1987) (finding that overall,
46% of males born in New York in 1956 were arrested at least once for a felony or
misdemeanor in New York between age 16 and 29, and that 71% of non-white males
were arrested, in contrast to 41% of white males); Lyle W. SHANNON, ASSESSING THE
RELATIONSHIP OF ADULT CRIMINAL CAREERS TO JUVENILE CAREERS (Office of Juvenile
Justice and Delinquency Prevention, 1980) (finding that 29.9% of males born in Racine,
Wisconsin, in 1942, had a police contact for a felony or misdemeanor before reaching
18, as did 35.7% of a 1949 cohort and for 31.0% of a 1955 cohort, and that if moving
violations are included 60% of males eventually found their ways into police records);
Jerome G. Miller, From Social Safety Net to Dragnet: African American Males in the
Criminal Justice System, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 479, 485 (1994) (on review of these
studies and others, estimating that "the percentage of nonwhite males [in cities] who
could expect to be arrested and at least briefly jailed would [be] 90%"). The studies
cited here that report less than 50% of black males experiencing arrest cover relatively
short lifetime segments.
148. That a majority of males will be arrested for a nontraffic offense, at some
point in their lives, is evident from the studies described supra note 143; see also Joan
Petersilia, Criminal Career Research: A Review of Recent Evidence, in 2 CRIME AND
JUSTICE: AN ANNUAL REVIEW OF RESEARCH 321, 344 (Norval Morris & Michael Tonry,
eds.) (showing, on reanalysis of data covering the adult years of Shannon's cohorts in
Racine, Wisconsin, that 46.5% of the 1942 cohort, 59.9% of the 1949 cohort and 43.7%
of the 1955 cohort had had at least one recorded police contact for a felony or
misdemeanor by age 29); Tillman, supra note 147, at 565 (concluding that "[t]aken
together, the results of previous [studies of the prevalence of arrest] indicate that among
urban males 60% will have been arrested (or have a recorded 'police contact') for a
nontraffic offense and 25% will be arrested for an index offense at some point during
their lifetimes"); Marvin Wolfgang, Delinquency in Two Birth Cohorts, 27 AM.
BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST 75 (1983) (finding, upon following to age 30 the cohort of males
born in Philadelphia in 1945, that 47% had had at least one police contact by that point
in their lives, and that 22% had been arrested at least once for an FBI Index offense).
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only" database would have the look and feel of a universal DNA
database for black males, whose already jaundiced view of law
enforcement's legitimacy1 49 is itself a threat to public safety. 5 ' White
men would not likely be pleased either. Some would surely be offended
by the racial imbalance in their favor-particularly one so redolent of
past genetic discrimination-and many white males would be distressed
to learn that, absent dramatic change in their behavior or in police
practices, at least half of them would have their DNA profiles entered
into the database, following arrest for a felony or misdemeanor. If
legislation were to authorize DNA sampling for traffic offenses as well,
then a majority of the entire population might eventually find its way
into the database. 151
149. See RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE CRIME AND THE LAW 24-26 (1997); MICHAEL
TONRY, MALIGN NEGLECT: RACE, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA (1995). Kennedy
argues that America remains caught in the crisis of legitimacy described half a century ago
by Gunnar Myrdal:
Negroes . . .are hurt in their trust that the law is impartial, that the
court and the police are their protection, and, indeed, that they
belong to an orderly society which has set up this machinery for
common security and welfare. They will not feel confidence in, and
loyalty toward, a legal order which is entirely out of their control
and which they sense to be inequitable and merely part of the system
of caste oppression. Solidarity then develops easily in the Negro
group, a solidarity against the law and the police.
Id. at 24 (quoting 1 GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM
AND MODERN DEMOCRACY 52 (1944)). Kennedy points to the deep roots and longevity of
our crisis of legitimacy:
For a long time, criminal law-not simply the biased administration
of law but the law itself-was the enemy of African-Americans. In
many places, for several generations, it was a crime for blacks to
learn to read, to flee enslavement, or to defend themselves, their
families, or their friends from physical abuse. It was a crime, in
sum, for blacks to do all sort of things deemed to be permissible or
admirable when done by others. . . .[During the civil rights era],
[b]y using the criminal law against [those] involved in resisting racial
oppression, officials . . . destabilized the moral meaning of
conforming to law and violating it .... [This history invites the view
that administration of the criminal law is] pervasively infected by a
systematic racial bias that nullifies its legitimacy [and] reinforce[s]
hostility toward the agencies of crime control ....
Id. at 26-27.
150. See TOM TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (1990) (finding that
compliance with the criminal law is secured not so much by the threat of punishment as
by perceptions that the laws are congruent with moral obligations, or at the least enacted
properly by legitimate authority, and that they are executed fairly).
151. The Supreme Court has distinguished "interrogation relating to one's
identity or a request for identification," which "does not, by itself, constitute a Fourth
Amendment seizure," from "a detention under the Fourth Amendment," and from a
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If arresting officers were given discretion not to sample DNA, this
fraction might well be reduced, but there is little comfort in the prospect
of individual officers on the highways sampling DNA from those who
strike them as likely perpetrators of other crimes, while sending the rest
on their way. Under those conditions, racial conflict in police
encounters with civilians and racial disparities in the database would be
likely to grow considerably worse. Neither are state legislatures likely
to make parsimonious decisions about which arrests permit or require
DNA sampling. As is happening with convictions, if arrest becomes the
threshold for inclusion in the databases, then the pressure for
comprehensive coverage is likely to be nearly irresistible." 2
"traditional arrest." INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 215-16 (1984). In drawing these
lines, it has offered the following rather general guidance:
Given the diversity of encounters between police officers and citizens,
however, the Court has been cautious in defining the limits imposed by the
Fourth Amendment on encounters between the police and citizens. As we
have noted elsewhere: "Obviously, not all personal intercourse between
policemen and citizens involves 'seizures' of persons. Only when the
officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has restrained the
liberty of a citizen may we conclude that a 'seizure' has occurred." . . .
While applying such a test is relatively straightforward in a situation
resembling a traditional arrest . . . . the protection against unreasonable
seizures also extends to "seizures that involve only a brief detention short of
traditional arrest." What has evolved from our cases is a determination that
an initially consensual encounter between a police officer and a citizen can
be transformed into a seizure or detention within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment, "if, in view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a
reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave."
Id. at 215 (citations omitted). Most automobile stops would seem to entail a seizure of
the person under these principles, but whether they would be an arrest within the
meaning of a statute authorizing the taking of a DNA sample "upon arrest" would
depend on the specific legislation.
Even if an automobile stop for a traffic violation starts out as something less than
an arrest, however, it usually lies within the officer's discretion whether to escalate the
stop to an arrest, whether to search incident to that arrest, and whether to transport the
driver to a facility for booking and detention pending first appearance in court.
Moreover, when a motorist is stopped by police for an offense for which "a traditional
arrest" is permissible in the jurisdiction, the officer almost always has probable cause to
arrest, and there is no constitutional bar to police consummating the arrest and
conducting a full search incident to it. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973);
cf. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista 531 U.S. 990 (2000) (holding it not unreasonable, and
therefore no violation of the Fourth Amendment, to make a full custodial arrest of a
driver for failing to fasten her seatbelt and the seatbelts of her children, and to take her
in handcuffs to a police station, to search her person, and to detain her there for over an
hour).
152. See, e.g., Editorial, Testing Suspects to Prevent Tragedies, N.Y. POST,
Aug. 18, 2000, at 33 ("If cops were allowed to take DNA samples from all the suspects
they arrest, Laura Nusser and Patricia Sullivan might be alive today.").
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The likely reach of an arrest-based database should give pause to
anyone hoping to limit database coverage to a small fraction of the
population. Inclusion in a DNA identification database of half or more
of the male population and nearly all African American men is an odd
result for a policy intended to limit government's control of samples and
profiles of our DNA-and it is one that would further damage the
legitimacy of the criminal law and of law enforcement agencies in areas
where public safety is most in disrepair. 53 Finally, the data on
prevalence of arrest in the population should provoke skepticism about
two propositions often advanced in opposition to a comprehensive
identification database: (1) that it is financially and logistically feasible
to sample DNA on arrest, but not feasible to sample everyone; and (2)
that privacy interests will be substantially protected if DNA is taken and
typed "only" from those who have been arrested.
In contrast, a population-wide DNA database could serve as at least
a partial, much-needed antidote for the racial distortions that plague the
criminal justice system. DNA evidence does not care about race. A
database profile either does or does not match a crime-scene sample.
With a population-wide database, the identity of any matching individual
would be known-no matter what the race. Routine production of a
short list of people whose DNA matches samples found at a crime scene
thus could help counteract the presence or perception of racism in the
investigation of crime. When a person is arrested and incriminating
crime scene DNA evidence points to the guilt of another person whose
DNA profile is in the database, prompt exoneration and release of the
innocent is likely to follow-regardless of the initial suspect's race or
status. If an innocent defendant does go to trial in such a case, the
crime scene DNA evidence and the results of the database search would
be available, regardless of the defendant's race, to raise reasonable
doubt about guilt.
153. Furthermore, making arrest the threshold for inclusion in law enforcement
DNA databases reflects a naive view of what it means to be arrested. If sampling were
"limited" to those who are arrested, then what would legitimately distinguish them from
the half of us whose profiles would not routinely be available to criminal investigators?
The legal threshold for DNA profiling in this scenario would be the existence, at some
point in time, of probable cause to believe the person is committing or has committed a
crime. As most young black males know all too well, police have nearly unfettered
discretion to arrest when probable cause exists, and officers are not constitutionally
prohibited from making pretextual arrests or focusing arrest activity in any particular
area or on any particular subgroup of the population-so long as a rational basis for the
selection can be offered in justification. Indeed, probable cause to arrest is spread thick
and wide through the populace, attaching to the innocent-in-fact as well as to those guilty
of the crime for which probable cause exists. Probable cause is thus an extremely low
threshold, and a poor shield against the government taking and profiling our DNA-and
against abuse of that power.
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This is not to say that a population-wide database would eliminate
all racial inequities in law enforcement. Obviously, it would not. For
instance, even the most inclusive database will not cure the racial
distortions that result from selectively enforcing drug laws against
African Americans or from enforcing even-handedly drug laws that have
a disparate impact on these citizens. But to concede that a
comprehensive DNA identification-only database is no panacea for the
racial ills that beset the criminal justice system is not to deny its power
to mitigate what has become a crippling problem. It is simply more fair
and more useful to include DNA identification profiles from all whites
as well as all from all other groups than it is to amass databases pre-
dominantly consisting of the DNA profiles of African Americans and
other minorities.
CONCLUSION
The current debate over the scope of DNA databases for law
enforcement is myopic in its focus on which crimes should be collection
offenses and at which stage in the criminal process DNA samples should
be taken. In principle, it is not at all clear why the obligation to provide
personally identifying DNA data should be restricted to those individuals
who are swept into the criminal justice system. In practice, settling for
a DNA identification database restricted to convicts, or to convicts and
arrestees, is sure to aggravate racial polarization in society, undermine
the legitimacy of law and law enforcement, and further compromise
public safety by halting far short of the deterrent and investigative
capability that a population-wide database would afford. Like the
double helix of the DNA molecule, privacy and equality are intertwined
in complex ways. When they are untangled and evaluated, the case for
a population-wide DNA database is strong.
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